

Journal of Politeness Research: Language, Behaviour, Culture

Volume 4 (2008) Number 2

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MOUTON DE GRUYTER
BERLIN NEW YORK

Print ISSN 1612-5681
Online ISSN 1663-4877

Journal of Politeness Research: Language, Behaviour, Culture

Vol. 4 · Number 2 · 2008

MOUTON DE GRUYTER

Journal of Politeness Research:

Language, Behaviour, Culture

Volume 4 (2008) Number 2

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Special Issue: Impoliteness: Eclecticism and Diaspora
Edited by Derek Bousfield and Jonathan Culpeper

MOUTON DE GRUYTER

Abstract

After a few introductory remarks on recent impoliteness research, a preliminary definition of impoliteness/rudeness is given. Then the important role emotions play in relation to (im)politeness is briefly sketched, followed by descriptions of some connections between emotional arguments, fallacies and impoliteness. Emotional arguments need not be fallacious nor are they always formulated in impolite ways. However, certain fallacious subtypes of emotional arguments involving appeals to negative emotions tend to be formulated in an impolite way. Such arguments are called "destructive arguments" in this paper.

A few case studies of spoken and written passages of argumentative discourse are used to support the hypothesis that certain subtypes of emotional arguments are likely to be destructive. It is also shown, however, that sometimes even fallacious arguments involving positive emotions, such as pity, can be formulated in an impolite way. Finally, it is demonstrated that in certain exceptional cases even rude and fallacious arguments are not (totally) destructive because they ultimately serve some vital interests of the opponent.

Key words: impoliteness, emotions, fallacies, emotional arguments, destructive arguments.

1. Introduction

In this paper I would like to explore the close relationship between impoliteness and certain subtypes of emotional arguments. In spite of this close relationship, research on impoliteness and the study of emotional arguments have so far usually pursued their goals separately. But given the overlap of their objects of study, both research traditions could profit from an integrated perspective. More specifically, impolite behaviour

often involves some kind of emotional argument. Therefore, the analysis of the structure and function of these types of emotional arguments could enhance our understanding of the propositional content of impolite utterances. Conversely, the interpersonal dimension of emotional arguments could be better understood if the impolite formulations which are often used to express emotional arguments are analyzed according to models and principles of impoliteness. However, before turning to such an integrated perspective, I wish to recapitulate some recent results of research on impoliteness and to provide a preliminary definition of impoliteness.

Among the most important results of (recent) research on impoliteness (Laechenicht 1980; Culpeper 1996; Kienpoinntner 1997, 2003; Eelen 2001; Culpeper et al. 2003; Watts 2003; Bolívar 2005; Culpeper 2005; Kaul de Marlangeon 2005) is the insight that impoliteness is not a secondary phenomenon, that is, the marked, peripheral and exceptional counterpart of politeness.

Within certain contexts, situations or institutions, impoliteness is even the normal and expectable communicative behaviour, e.g., in army recruit training (Culpeper 1996), in cross-examination within courtroom interaction (Lakoff 1989), in disputes between traffic wardens ("clampers") and owners of illegally parked cars (Culpeper et al. 2003), in "exploitative" chat shows and quiz shows (Culpeper 2005), in political conflicts between political leaders, parties and their followers, especially during election campaigns or during periods of hostile relationships between government and opposition (Harris 2001, Kienpoinntner 2003, Bolívar 2005).

Moreover, it has been shown that there is a politeness/impoliteness continuum, ranging from polite behaviour and more or less harmless or even cooperative forms of impoliteness, such as banter, ritual insults and (moderate) reactive impoliteness, to more competitive, harmful and aggressive forms of private or public rudeness. My main point in this contribution will be that competitive rudeness is systematically related to certain subtypes of emotional arguments, which are a highly competitive means of argumentation.

In order to distinguish between cooperative and competitive ways of (im)polite argumentative interaction, I have first to define the concept of "cooperativity" (which overlaps in important respects with the concept of "reasonableness"). A tentative definition of this complex concept could be given in the following way (cf. Kienpoinntner 1997: 255): Two persons A and B interact cooperatively if they 1) try to reach a goal G which is mutually accepted, 2) try to do this by fair and efficient means, and 3) are equally interested in reaching G or at least share some interest in reaching G. "Cooperativity" in the narrow sense of the word is only

achieved if all three criteria are met; however, one might still legitimately call some interaction "cooperative to a certain degree" if only one or two of these criteria are met (cf. below, section 3, example 8). Correspondingly, competitive interaction lacks some or all of these defining properties.

For the purposes of this paper, I will use "impoliteness" and "rudeness" as synonyms, bearing in mind that this use of "impoliteness"/"rudeness" as technical terms within theories of pragmatics and sociolinguistics is "second order impoliteness" ("impoliteness2"), in the sense of Watts (2003: 30–32), who criticizes all attempts to abstract from "first order (im)politeness" ("impoliteness1" = "lay conceptualizations"). Yet, although it is indeed problematic and maybe premature to hope for a truly universal definition of "impoliteness" at the present stage of research, I do hope that an approximately adequate and potentially universal definition of "second order impoliteness" can be given. With this background in mind, competitive impoliteness/rudeness could be defined as follows:

Impoliteness/Rudeness is a kind of prototypically non-cooperative or competitive communicative behaviour:

- which destabilizes the personal relationships of the interacting individuals and thus makes it more difficult to achieve the mutually accepted goal of the interaction or makes it difficult to agree on a mutually accepted goal in the first place;
- which, more particularly, creates or maintains an emotional atmosphere of mutual irreverence and antipathy, which primarily serves egocentric interests;
- which is partially determined by concepts of power, distance, emotional attitudes and cost-benefit scales which are generally accepted in a speech community.

2. Emotions and (im)politeness

In order to explore the relationship between (im)politeness and emotional arguments, a few remarks on the interdependence of (im)politeness and emotions have to be made (cf. Kienpoinntner, in press, for a more detailed treatment). It is impossible to establish an exhaustive definition, let alone a detailed description of "emotions" within the limits of this article. However, I would like to suggest at least a tentative definition and to add some remarks concerning differing types of emotions and their alleged universality. These remarks are intended to provide some background for the following discussion of the connections be-

tween emotions and (im)politeness. "Emotions" can be defined as psychophysical processes which are experienced as strong feelings. According to their perception, emotions can be classified as positive (pleasant) or negative (unpleasant) feelings. In this way, positive emotions such as love, affection and happiness can be contrasted with negative emotions such as hate, fear and disgust.

Moreover, there have been attempts to distinguish between a small set of primary emotions (e.g., surprise, fear, disgust, anger, happiness, sadness according to Ekman and Friesen 1975; a much longer list is given by Ekman 1999) from secondary emotions (e.g., pity, envy, jealousy). Primary emotions have been claimed to be innate and universal. This, however, is highly controversial and the debate between universalists (e.g., Shaver et al. 1992) and relativists (e.g., Lutz 1988) is not yet finished. There are, however, some plausible suggestions that an intermediate position should be taken, which assumes that there is "no real conflict between the view that human feelings can be 'embodied' and have a biological dimension and the view that they are 'socially constructed' and have a cultural dimension" (Wierzbicka 1999: 306; cf. also Kövecses 2000: 185).

Turning back to the relationship between (im)politeness and emotions, first of all, it has to be stressed that the importance of emotions as a factor influencing (im)polite behaviour has been downplayed in standard theories of (im)politeness such as Brown and Levinson (1987 [1978]), who describe their "model person" (= "MP") as a rational agent whose rationality consists in "the availability to our MP of a precisely definable mode of reasoning from ends to the means that will achieve those ends" (Brown and Levinson 1987: 58).

However, apart from factors such as power, distance and rank of imposition, the emotional relationship between the interlocutors, too, plays a decisive role, influencing the cooperative or competitive climate of the ongoing interaction. This has rightly been stressed by Watts (2003: 96–97).

Furthermore, even a theory of (im)politeness based on a model person defined as a rational agent cannot exclude the emotions because many of them have rational aspects (Nussbaum 1996). For example, fear, if not exaggerated, can be perfectly rational in certain situations because it helps us to be cautious in dangerous moments. Furthermore, pity/compassion can compel people to support altruistic activities and thus contribute to an improvement of the stability of a social group, society or culture. To give but one more example: anger, if contextually justified, can make us fight against violations of principles of justice.

Moreover, the three main factors determining (im)politeness in Brown and Levinson's (1987 [1978]) theory, namely, power, distance and rank

of imposition, imply certain emotions. For example, great differences of power can create both positive and negative emotions such as contempt, fear, awe and respect; minimal social distance is often combined with positive or negative emotions such as love, sympathy, hate, anger, indignation (note that the adjective 'positive', when combined with "emotion(s)" qualifies a phenomenon which is normally appreciated; combined with "impoliteness", it denotes a behaviour which is to be rejected according to standard norms of cooperative behaviour). And even Brown and Levinson (1987: 16) admit that "[...] we can only concede that 'liking' might be an independent variable affecting choice of politeness strategy". Finally, the rank of imposition of a speech act in a culture often implies certain emotions, for example, the fear of being intrusive in Anglo-Saxon culture, or the desire to be included into a social group in Spanish culture.

3. Impoliteness and emotional arguments

As far as emotional arguments are concerned, they have traditionally been analyzed and criticized as fallacies, that is non-cooperative moves in argumentation according to the so-called "standard treatment of fallacies" (cf. Hamblin 1998 [1970] for a critical survey). The traditional criticism of these arguments is based on the assumption that emotions are irrelevant for the justification or refutation of a controversial standpoint and hence should be dismissed in every cooperative discussion. Fallacies are here generally understood as non-cooperative moves within an argumentative interaction. Why are fallacious arguments non-cooperative? The answer is: fallacies block the general goal of finding a joint resolution to a conflict of opinion by reasoning (see van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004). Furthermore, fallacies do not enhance the shared interests of the discussants, but only serve the egoistic self-interests of some speaker/some involved party and often conceal this by manipulating the opponent(s)/the audience.

However, in some recent studies on emotional arguments (Walton 1992, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2006; Planin 1998, 2005), it has been plausibly argued that not all instances of emotional arguments are fallacious. As some emotions (in some contexts) can have rational aspects (cf. above, section 2), it is no wonder that emotional arguments can be plausible to a certain degree. This is the case, for example, if we lack sufficient evidence, are in a hurry and nevertheless have to clarify a controversial issue. Then it can be plausible to rely on emotional appeals provisionally. Already Aristotle accepted not only rational arguments ("logos"), but also emotional appeals (the "ethos" of the speaker and the emotions ("pathos") of the audience) as legitimate means of persuasion (Aristotle

1959: rhet. 1356a). The problem for the critical evaluation of potentially fallacious arguments, then, is not to distinguish between rational arguments and emotional arguments, but to distinguish between plausible and illegitimate uses of emotional arguments.

As far as subtypes of emotional arguments are concerned, especially the *argumentum ad hominem* (personal attacks) and the *argumentum ad populum* (appeals to the emotions of the masses) appear in many different subtypes (see Walton 1998, 1999, 2006). Among the arguments *ad hominem* the following subtypes most likely involve strategies of impoliteness:

1. direct personal attacks questioning the physical and mental abilities of the attacked person, often combined with insults and swearwords ("abusive *ad hominem*");
2. accusations of being inherently and permanently biased ("poisoning the well");
3. reproaches concerning the membership within a social group, which, according to the speaker, has negative properties ("guilt by association").

Walton (1998: 250) provides an explicit reconstruction of the fallacious argument scheme "Negative Ethotic Ad Hominem Argument from Cognitive Skills" (= *Cognition Ad hominem*), a subtype of the abusive *ad hominem* argument:

COGNITION *Ad hominem*

a has a bad character for logical reasoning.

Therefore *a*'s argument *a* should not be accepted.

Arguments *ad populum*, too, appear in many subtypes (Walton 1999). Those most relevant for strategies of impoliteness are 1. the "rhetoric-of-belonging" subtype, where the speaker appeals to the desire of the audience to belong to a certain group. 2. If the relevant group is the majority, to which all "normal" persons "naturally" want to belong, this subtype is a "common-folks" *ad populum* argument. 3. The "mob-appeal" *ad populum* argument is the "rhetoric-of-belonging" subtype combined with the appeal to popular sentiments like sympathy, hate and anger, and the "common-folks" subtype.

As to the relationship between emotional arguments and impoliteness, it has to be stressed that, in principle, there is no necessary connection. This is especially clear as far as positive emotions are concerned: appeals to pity, sympathy and feelings of awe and respect are prototypically linked with positive and negative politeness rather than with rudeness.

But even emotional arguments involving negative emotions can be formulated politely. Some subtypes of emotional arguments, however, are often expressed with the help of impoliteness strategies (cf. below).

Likewise, it has to be stressed that there is no necessary link between fallaciousness and impoliteness. Both plausible and fallacious arguments occur in polite and impolite formulations. But again, some subtypes of emotional arguments tend to be both fallacious and rude. In these cases, the impoliteness strategies involved are used to intensify and aggravate the impact of the fallacious arguments on the opponent by threatening the faces of the opponents in an offensive way. In the following, I wish to concentrate on these potentially dangerous types of emotional arguments, which I call "destructive" emotional arguments (cf. below, section 4).

For a systematic analysis of the relationship between these and other (sub)types of emotional arguments and impoliteness the catalogue of strategies of impoliteness listed in Culpeper et al. (2003: 1554–1555) will be used (note that strategies 1 to 3, but not 4 and 5 are necessarily competitive impoliteness; a similar list appears in Culpeper 2005: 41–42):

1. "*Bald on record impoliteness*. [...] bald on record impoliteness' is typically deployed where there is much face at stake, and where there is an intention on the part of the speaker to attack the face of the hearer.
2. *Positive impoliteness*. The use of strategies designed to damage the addressee's positive face wants ('ignore, snub the other', 'exclude the other from the activity', 'dissociate from the other', 'be disinterested, unconcerned, unsympathetic', 'use inappropriate identity markers', 'use obscure or secretive language', 'seek disagreement', 'make the other feel uncomfortable (e.g., do not avoid silence, joke, or use small talk)', 'use taboo words', 'call the other names', etc.)
3. *Negative impoliteness*. The use of strategies designed to damage the addressee's negative face wants ('frighten', 'condescend, scorn, or ridicule', 'invade the other's space', 'explicitly associate the other with a negative aspect', 'put the other's indebtedness on record', 'hinder or block the other — physically or linguistically' etc.).
4. *Sarcasm or mock politeness*. The use of politeness strategies that are obviously insincere, and thus remain surface realizations. Sarcasm (mock politeness for social disharmony) is clearly the opposite of banter (mock impoliteness for social harmony).
5. *Withhold politeness*. Keep silent or fail to act where politeness work is expected."

Several case studies will be undertaken (cf. section 4) in order to test the following three more specific hypotheses about the relationship between emotional arguments and impoliteness:

- A. Fallacious instances of certain subtypes of emotional arguments tend to be accompanied and aggravated by impoliteness strategies, that is, they become destructive emotional arguments.
- B. This positive correlation between fallacious emotional arguments and impoliteness is to be expected, particularly in the case of certain subtypes of emotional arguments involving negative emotions, but in some contexts they can also be observed in fallacious emotional arguments involving positive emotions.
- C. Not all rude and fallacious emotional arguments are destructive. In certain exceptional contexts, even fallacious emotional arguments expressed in a highly impolite way cannot be judged as (totally) uncooperative.

In the following section, a small collection of passages taken from written or spoken argumentative texts is analyzed in order to test the three hypotheses formulated above. The majority of the examples come from German texts, but English and French examples have also been used. Needless to say, this small sample would have to be enlarged considerably in order to arrive at more far-reaching (cross-linguistic) generalizations.

4. Case studies

My first example concerns the abusive variant of the *argumentum ad hominem*. The relevant passage is taken from a TV-confrontation between the former Austrian prime minister Wolfgang Schäussel (leader of the Austrian conservative party) and Alfred Gusenbauer (now prime minister, leader of the Austrian social democrats), then his rival candidate. The debate took place on September 21, 2006 and was broadcasted nationwide by the ORF (the public Austrian TV station). After some weeks of tough pre-election competition, both candidates do not refrain from attacking their opponent's personality and character. As these attacks are to be expected within types of political discourse such as parliamentary discourse (cf. Harris 2001) or TV-confrontations between political opponents (cf. Kienpointner 2003), one might doubt whether impolite arguments are actually experienced as impolite. However, as Culpeper (2005: 63–67) argues convincingly, even within institutional contexts where aggressive face-attacks are normally sanctioned, partici-

pants may still experience these attacks as (extremely) rude/impolite, as my first example shows.

In the following passage, Schäussel reacts to Gusenbauer's reproach that the Conservative Government did not increase the pensions enough, which according to Gusenbauer made aged people suffer from dwindling purchasing power. Schäussel replies that the pensions have been raised enough to compensate for the inflation rate. To support this argument, he invokes the authority of a well-known Austrian research institute of economics ("Wifo" = "Wirtschaftsforschungsinstitut"). When Gusenbauer doubts the figures and insists on his earlier claim, Schäussel remarks that even he, that is, Gusenbauer, can calculate these figures, letting Gusenbauer appear as a person who can only do very simple calculations:

(1) GU: ... Und genau DAS darf nicht so weitergehen. Denn es

And exactly that must not like this go on. Since it
MUSST die KAUFkraft erhalten bleiben, wenn
must the purchasing power retained remain, if
man WIRKLICH von Fairness reden will
one really about fairness talk wants.

'And exactly that's what must not go on in this way, since the purchasing power must be maintained, if you really want to talk about fairness.'

TH: [...]

SCH:

[Also] die Pensionen/ die Pensionen sind erhöht/ die
Well, the pensions/ the pensions are raised/ the
Durchschnittspension/ für eine Alterspension ist von
average pension/ for an old-age-pension has from
860 auf 1000 Euro gestiegen. 15,5% plus. Die
860 to 1000 Euro risen. 15,5% plus. The
Inflation ist um 15% gestiegen. KEINE Rede von dem,
inflation has by 15% risen. No talk of that,
was Sie da erzählen. ALLE Fakten sprechen gegen
what you there tell. All facts speak against
Sie.
you.

'Well, the pensions/the pensions are raised/the average pension/for an old-age-pension has risen from 860 to 1000 Euros. 15.5% more. The inflation has gone up 15%. What you are telling us is incorrect. All facts argue against you.'

GU: *Stimmt ja nit.*
Right is PT not.

'That's clearly not right.'

SCH: *Also! Das ist Wifo. Das ist*
Look that is Wifo. That is
Wirtschaftsforschungsinstitut.
Research Institute of Economics.

'Look! that is Wifo. That is Research Institute of Economics.'

GU: *Ein einziges [Prozent] der Inflationsrate [ein einziges*
One only percent of the inflation rate. one only
Mal]
time.

'Only one percent of the inflation rate. Only one time.'

SCH: *[Das ist] Das ist [Wirtschafts] das ist die Zahl des*
That is That is economics that is the figure of the
Wifos. Von 860 Durchschnittspension auf 1000. Das
Wifo. From 860 average pension to 1000. That
können sogar Sie nachrechnen.
can even you check.

'That is that is economics that is the figure of the Wifo.
From 860 for an average pension to 1000. Even you can
check that.'

Transcription symbols: GU = Alfred Gusenbauer; TH = Ingrid Thurnher, TV host; SCH = Schüssel; ... = omitted passage; CAPITALS = syllable with special emphasis; (...) = not understandable; [...] = overlapping passages; / = self-correction; PT = particle.

Although Schüssel does not use swear words and at first view simply states an "innocent" fact about the mental abilities of Gusenbauer (and there is not even a special emphasis on *Sie* in *Das können sogar Sie nachrechnen* 'Even you can check that'), his remark is an instance of off-record impoliteness. The remark triggers the highly offensive implicature (both for Gusenbauer and the audience) 'You are too stupid to do difficult calculations, but this one is easy enough even for you'.

On the one hand, this abusive *ad hominem* attack cannot be dismissed as totally irrelevant, because in a public debate between party leaders the mental abilities and deficiencies of potential future prime ministers clearly are an important issue. On the other hand, however, Schüssel's

critical remark is so exaggerated that it can plausibly be criticized as a fallacious *ad hominem* attack which is aggravated by its impolite formulation and the negative emotions involved. Among these negative emotions are Schüssel's scorn and contempt and the embarrassment and indignation experienced by Gusenbauer, who is hiding them behind a "poker face" for the moment, but a few minutes later is counterattacking Schüssel aggressively with another instance of an impolite abusive *ad hominem* argument. Therefore, Schüssel's earlier attack is a destructive emotional argument, which in Walton's (1998: 250) terms can be classified as a "Negative ethotic *ad hominem* argument from cognitive skills" (cf. above, section 3).

Differing from other *ad hominem* attacks, the "poisoning the well" variant not only discredits its target as a rational discussant for the moment, but tries to silence the opponent forever, accusing him or her to be a person too biased to be taken seriously in any discussion on certain topics. A classical case of the "poisoning the well" variant of the argument *ad hominem* is given by Walton (2006: 275):

(2) The British novelist and clergyman Charles Kingsley, attacking the famous Catholic intellectual John Henry Cardinal Newman, argued thus: Cardinal Newman's claims were not to be trusted because, as a Roman Catholic Priest, (Kingsley alleged) Newman's first loyalty was not to the truth.

In the case of Newman, the argument given by Kingsley also alludes "that Newman is intellectually dishonest, a person who will put other considerations, like church interests, before the truth of a matter being discussed" (Walton 2006: 290). Newman was so upset by this attack that he wrote a whole book (*Apologia pro sua vita*, 1864) in order to defend himself against this attack, which makes use of strategies of positive and negative impoliteness such as "exclude the other from the activity" or "hinder or block the other". Walton (2006: 275) concludes that "Newman was right to be upset, and to take great care to reply to Kingsley's attack, because this type of poisoning the well argument can be extremely powerful as an unfair method of attacking an opponent".

The next example combines another variant of abusive *ad hominem* attacks, namely "negative ethotic *ad hominem* arguments from morals", with the "guilt by association" *ad hominem* argument (cf. Walton 1998: 251, 257).

In the year 2001, the Austrian politician Jörg Haider (at the time leader of the Austrian Freedom Party) attacked Ariel Muzicant (presi-

dent of the Jewish Religious Community in Austria) in a public speech (held on Ash Wednesday, February 28, 2001, in Ried im Innkreis; quoted after Pelinka and Wodak 2002: 233; cf. also Wodak and Reisigl 2002).

(3) HAIDER: [...] und der Herr Muzicant, von der

and this Mr. Muzicant, of the
Kulngemeinde in Wien hat noch sein übriges
 Jewish community in Vienna has PT his additional
gemacht, hat in ganz Amerika circular letters mit
 done has in whole America Rundschreiben with
dem jüdischen Weltkongress geschickt, wo er
 the Jewish world congress sent, where he
gesagt hat: "Jetzt müssen wir schon sammeln,
 said has: "Now must we already collect,
weil unsere Mitbürger sind wieder bedrängt und
 because our fellow citizens are again pressed and
müssen Österreich verlassen." Der Herr Ariel
 must Austria leave." This Mr. Ariel
Muzicant. Ich verstehe überhaupt nicht wie, wenn
 Muzicant. I understand not at all how, if
einer Ariel heißt, so viel Dreck am Stecken
 someone Ariel is called, so much dirt at the stick
haben kann.
 have can.

[...] and Mr. Muzicant, of the Jewish Religious Community in Vienna, has done additional things, he has sent circular letters to every place in America, together with the Jewish World Congress, where he said: "Now we already have to collect money because our fellow citizens are again under pressure and have to leave Austria." This Mr. Ariel Muzicant. I don't understand at all how somebody who is called Ariel can have so much "dirt on his stick" (= can be so corrupt/can have a skeleton in his cupboard, M. K.)

In this passage, Haider accuses Muzicant of having participated within an alleged international campaign leading to EU sanctions against the participation of the Freedom Party in an Austrian government coalition from 2000 onwards. According to Haider, this shows the bad moral character of Muzicant as an individual, but Haider at the same time also appeals to anti-Semitic stereotypes of Jewish plotting and scheming and

a Jewish conspiracy all over the world, as he explicitly mentions a circular letter sent by Muzicant and the Jewish World Congress to inform U.S. citizens about his worries concerning the rise of anti-Semitism in Austria. Apart from this combination of an abusive *ad hominem* attack and a guilt by association attack, Haider does not refrain from applying another highly dubious argument scheme. This scheme is based on inferences from proper names to physical or mental abilities or deficiencies of the individuals having these names (see Kienpointner 2005a): "Ariel" is the brand name of a detergent well known in Austria, so a person called "Ariel" should not be involved with "dirty" affairs.

For obvious historical reasons, the Jewish minority in Austria had a perfectly legitimate interest in reacting to explicit and implicit anti-Semitic tendencies within Austria, especially within Austrian parties and their policies. Therefore, Haider's attack cannot be justified as an adequate and moderate reaction against earlier attacks of his political opponents. Moreover, his mixture of *ad hominem* techniques, the fallacious criticism of an alleged discrepancy between a first name and the bad moral character of its bearer and *ad populum* attacks (after all, Haider is indirectly also attacking the Jewish minority in Austria and the Jewish World Congress through "guilt by association"), is aggravated by negative impoliteness strategies such as "condescend, scorn or ridicule" and sarcastic mock politeness (note that, explicitly, Haider "naively" pretends "not to understand" how someone with the first name "Ariel" could be involved in dirty affairs).

Similar destructive emotional arguments are used by the French right-wing politician Jean-Marie Le Pen. In the following example, Le Pen, too, combines the guilt by association *ad hominem* subtype and the *argumentum ad interpretationem nominis*. But this time the goal of the attack are not Jews, but the French minority of migrants with an African origin. His xenophobic appeal is combined with an aggressive and highly impolite pun on the name of Kofi Yamgnane, at that time the French Secretary of State for integration (June 1991, quoted after Soucard et al. 1997: 27):

- (4) *Ce sont des Français du type de Yaka Miam-Miam, qui est*
 These are of French of the type of Yaka Miam-Miam, who is
devenu le secrétaire d'État à l'Intégration.
 become the secretary of state for integration.

'These are the French of the type of a Yaka Miam-Miam, who has become the Secretary of State for Integration.'

Le Pen's xenophobic appeal carries the implicature "(Black) Africans only think about eating; therefore, a minister of state for immigration with African origin is unacceptable". This conclusion would be, of course, an untenable generalization, if stated explicitly. So it is part of Le Pen's sly malignancy that he only conveys this conclusion implicitly. Moreover, like Haider, he uses a pun on the name of Kofi Yanganane, an onomatopoeic distortion of the name, which according to Le Pen, refers to the main or only interest of (Black) Africans, namely, eating (cf. *Miam-Miam*, through this ethnocentric stereotype, Le Pen is at the same time also attacking Black Africans *ad populum*; cf. below). This is an extremely aggressive instance of positive impoliteness strategies such as "use inappropriate identity markers" and, at the same time, negative impoliteness strategies such as "condescend, scorn, or ridicule".

As guilt by association *ad hominem* attacks rely on the membership of a person within an ethnic, social or political group for their persuasive impact, they come close to the next subtype of emotional arguments, namely, *ad populum* arguments. Among them, the "rhetoric-of-belonging", "common-folks" and "mob appeal" (see Walton 1999) subtypes most frequently correlate with impoliteness. More specifically, populist politicians try to appeal to negative emotions of the masses against certain out-groups and claim that "they" are different from "us" in clearly negative ways. Appealing to negative emotions like antipathy, hate, envy and contempt, politicians often describe the cultural "other" with the help of offensive proper names, and metaphors. Again, destructive emotional arguments frequently occur, as is illustrated with the following example:

- (5) *Der Wiener Drogenhandel ist fest in der Hand der Nigerianer. Jetzt bringen sie überdies noch den Straßenstrich Nigerianer. Now bring they in addition the street-walking under ihre Kontrolle. Georgier, Moldawier und Russen, dagegen sind berüchtigt für Wohnungs- und Hausdiebstühle, however are infamous for flat- and house-burglaries.*
- 'As to Viennese drug trafficking, the Nigerians have a firm grip on it. Now in addition, they bring the street-walking under their control. Georgians, Moldawians and Russians, however, are infamous for burgling flats and houses.'

This passage from a propaganda magazine *Wir Wiener* ("We, the Viennese") of the Viennese section of the right-wing Austrian Freedom Party

was published during the election campaign for the city council of Vienna, October 23, 2005. It appeals to emotions such as fear and hate concerning asylum-seeking immigrants. Moreover, they are based on overgeneralizations: there are criminal Nigerians (and criminal Nigerian asylum-seekers), but not all Nigerians are criminals, the same being true about the immigrants from other countries mentioned in the passage quoted above. But the generic sentences (cf. [1..] the Nigerians have a firm grip [1..], 'Georgians [...] are infamous [1..] in the passage imply a prototypical equivalence between, say, being a Nigerian in Vienna and being a criminal. The overgeneralizations portray the respective ethnic groups as essentially dangerous and violent people. This is an overly aggressive attack at the positive and negative face of these groups (using impoliteness strategies such as "snub the other", "explicitly associate the other with a negative aspect"). Thus they are both clear fallacious instances of an *argumentum ad populum* and highly impolite, in other words, destructive emotional arguments.

At this point, a supporter of the Freedom Party might come up with the objection that these statements are not fallacious because the crime rate among immigrants has indeed risen considerably during the last decades.

This fact cannot be denied, as data from the Austrian institute of statistics ("Statistik Austria") clearly show (cf. www.statistik.at; percentage of immigrants among convicted persons: 1975: 10.9%; 1985: 8.8%; 1995: 20.7%; 2000: 23.2%). But these statistical data have to be interpreted carefully, for example, by taking into account the followings facts (for a detailed comparison with other European countries, see Kienpöinner 2005b): Firstly, there are certain crimes only immigrants can commit (e.g., faking immigration documents). Secondly, the percentage of male persons is higher in the immigrant population than in the native population (and males commit many more crimes than females). Finally, immigrants usually have a low income and often lack higher education (and crimes are committed more frequently by poor people lacking higher education). All these factors contribute to a higher crime rate, but would also do so (or actually do so) in the native population, if present there.

I now turn to fear appeals (arguments *ad baculum*). A speaker using fear appeals can at the same time threaten the addressee because the speaker has the power to impose sanctions on the addressee. This is an argument *ad baculum* in the narrow sense (Walton 2000: 157–160). Or the speaker can appeal to fear and at the same time warn the addressee by alluding to sanctions which somebody else, usually some very powerful person or authority, can impose on the addressee. If the predicted

sanctions are horrible and the addressee's own point of view is not taken into account, the argument *ad baculum* is likely to become not only fallacious, because it shuts down the discussion, but also offensive. The fallaciousness results from trying to impose one's own opinion on the addressee by creating an atmosphere of extreme fear and from not discussing the full range of future events instead of only the frightful ones. The impoliteness is the effect of negative impoliteness strategies such as "frighten", "invade the other's space", "hinder or block the other".

Here is an example of a destructive appeal to fear: a leaflet distributed by fundamentalist Christian groups in Kufstein, Austria, in March 2007 and tries to convince the reader to believe in Jesus in order to be loved and saved by him. One of the arguments claims that there are only two options for the reader (bold characters, capital letters and underlining in the original):

(6) *Bedenke:*

Consider:

Du lebst ewig bei vollem Bewusstsein!

You live eternally at full consciousness!

Entweder im HIMMEL (wenn du JESUS und damit die

Either in heaven (if you Jesus and with that the

Tilgung deiner Sünden am Kreuz persönlich angenommen

deletion of your sins at the cross personally accepted

hast), oder in der HÖLLE (wenn du das selbstverleumdende,

have), or in the hell (if you the substitute,

Sünden-tilgende Leiden des Herrn JESUS CHRISTUS am

sin-deleting suffering of the Lord Jesus Christ at the

Kreuz nicht für dich in Anspruch genommen hast).

cross not for you use of have made).

'Consider this:

You live eternally, in full awareness!

Either in heaven (if you have personally accepted Jesus and with that the deletion of your sins at the cross), or in hell (if you have *not* made use for yourself of the substitute, sin-deleting suffering of the Lord Jesus Christ at the cross).'

Apart from threatening the addressee with the option of eternal punishment in hell and thus appealing to fear instead of reason, this passage is also very likely a black-white fallacy (a "false dilemma"): even if we accept Christian belief for the moment, there are more than just two

options for the believer. According to Christian belief, eternal punishment in hell is to be expected for mortal sins not followed by repentance and confession. For less important sins and repentant sinners, there is also the option of purgatory (at least, according to Christian belief in its Roman-Catholic version; Protestant and Evangelical communities reject 'purgatory' as a religious concept). This, however, is not mentioned in the passage at all. Furthermore, there is the problem whether all non-believers end in hell (even when they have lived a morally impeccable life) or not. This has been discussed controversially within Christianity from antiquity onwards.

But even for non-Christian readers, the passage is also highly offensive because it imposes a totally unacceptable reduction of their options for action or reaction to the challenges of human life. Thus, the formulation of the passage is likely to be perceived as a strategy of negative impoliteness, as an arrogant way of invading their space and to block many options of action which they consider to be perfectly feasible for themselves.

These case studies should suffice for showing that hypothesis A has some plausibility. I now turn to a case study supporting hypothesis B. Emotional arguments appealing to positive emotions, for example, arguments *ad misericordiam*, that is, appeals to pity, are often formulated politely, as those who appeal to these emotions normally do not want to offend their addressee(s). But there are exceptional cases where appeals to pity can be formulated in such a forceful way that they do not leave any other option to the addressee apart from fully and immediately supporting the speaker. In these cases, the appeals to pity become fallacious because they try to block further discussion. At the same time, they invade the space of the addressee and thus become clear instances of negative impoliteness. So, even appeals to pity can be destructive emotional arguments.

The following example illustrates a combination of a problematic appeal to pity (in this case, the subtype called "plea for excuse" by Walton (1997: 154)) and an indirect attack on the face of the addressee. The passage is taken from Culpeper et al. (2003: 1559–1560), who document arguments between traffic wardens and the owners of illegally parked cars. In this passage, the clumper (S1) and the car owner (S2) discuss the legitimacy of the punishment. The transcription is quoted after Culpeper et al. (2003: 1550, footnote 4). The stave transcription method indicates the interaction between the interlocutors; transcription difficulties, e.g., <indistinct> are placed between angled brackets; italics indicate the part of the discourse they wish to focus on:

(7)

S1: can you just answer me one question can you see the yellow line visibly

S2:

S1: under your car ...

S2: I live here why is there a yellow line anyway why do

S1:

S2: I have to park my car three hundred yards up the road it gets stolen

S1:

S2: broken into vandalized three times this year already why have you done

S1:

S2: it why do you make my life impossible how am I supposed to work doing

S1: can I just say you you you can clearly see the yellow line on the road

S2: this <indistinct>

S1: it's not a new yellow line it's been there for quite some time

S2:

so why don't you just

S1:

you shouldn't have parked on a yellow line

S2: stop the ticket

Using a series of rhetorical questions (cf. especially: (1) *why do I have to park my car three hundred yards up the road* [...], (2) *why have you done it*, (3) *why do you make my life impossible*, and (4) *how am I supposed to work doing this*), S2 puts S1 under pressure by implying the following: (1) It would be impossible to park the car elsewhere; (2) S1 should not have done it; (3) S1 is making life impossible for S2; and (4) S2 cannot go on to work under these circumstances.

It is quite clear that these arguments do not present recognized categories of excuses and that S1 would set a highly problematic precedent by accepting them. Only if S2's claims about the "impossibility of life" due to the parking regulations were true, they would indeed support the assumption that there is something special about S2's case. But S2's arguments seem to be so dramatically exaggerated, that it can be doubted whether they convey tenable propositions.

Furthermore, S2's rhetorical questions imply assumptions which attack the positive and negative face of S1. If true, these assumptions show that S1 is a hard-hearted and reckless person and try to reduce S1's options for action drastically. Therefore, S2's excusing pleas can be ana-

lyzed as indirectly impolite utterances attacking the positive and negative face of S2 (see Culpeper et al., 2003: 1560).

The final example is presented in order to support hypothesis C, that is, in exceptional cases, rude and fallacious emotional arguments are not necessarily at the same time (totally) destructive. It is taken from a literary text, because this passage from the drama "Antigone" by Jean Anouilh (quoted after Gladischevski 1996: 281) provides a particularly clear illustration of a rude and fallacious argument *ad baculum* which nevertheless cannot be called (totally) destructive.

Here is the mythological background of the passage: The corpse of Polynece is rotting unburied before the walls of Thebes because Polynece had attacked the city and was killed in a fight against his brother Étéocle, only to be declared a public enemy of Thebes afterwards. Créon, king of Thebes, the uncle of Antigone, tries to persuade her to immediately stop her repeated attempts to bury her brother Polynece by appealing to her fear of being tortured or even executed.

Créon does not engage in a fair exchange of arguments, but tries to block any further arguments by Antigone with his appeals to fear of pain and death (cf. Créon's warning *Mais n'en profite tout de même pas trop, petite peste* ... and his fictitious catalogue of brutal measures, e.g., torture, he could already have used to force Antigone to comply: *Si j'étais une bonne brute ordinaire de tyran, il y aurait déjà longtemps qu'on t'aurait attaché la langue, tiré les membres aux tenailles, ou jeté dans un trou*). As Créon abuses his advantage of being the King and much more powerful than Antigone, this is a clear case of a fallacious argument *ad baculum* (cf. Walton 2000: 188–191). Créon also insults Antigone (*petite peste* 'little bitch', *petite furie* 'little fury') and even uses nonverbal means of mistreatment (cf. *Moi, je suis le plus fort comme cela, j'en profite aussi*: "use of force" as a "non-argument", see Walton 2000: 174):

(8) C., lui serre le bras. — *Ecoute moi bien. J'ai le mauvais rôle, c'est entendu, et tu as le bon. Et tu le sens. Mais n'en profite tout de même pas trop, petite peste* ... *Si j'étais une bonne brute ordinaire de tyran, il y aurait déjà longtemps qu'on t'aurait attaché la langue, tiré les membres aux tenailles, ou jeté dans un trou. Mais tu vois dans mes yeux quelque chose qui hésite, tu vois que je te laisse parler au lieu d'appeler mes soldats; alors, tu nargues, tu attaques tant que tu peux. Où veux-tu en venir, petite peste?*

A. — *Lâchez-moi. Vous me faites mal au bras avec votre main.*

C., qui serre plus fort. — *Non. Moi, je suis le plus fort comme cela, j'en profite aussi.*

A., pousse un petit cri. — *Âie!*
 C., dont les yeux rient. *C'est peut-être ce que je devrais faire après tout, tout simplement, te tordre le poignet, te tordre les cheveux comme on fait aux filles dans les jeux.* (Il la regarde encore. Il redevient grave. Il lui dit tout près.) *Je suis ton oncle, c'est entendu, mais nous ne sommes pas tendres les uns pour les autres, dans la famille. Cela ne semble pas drôle, tout de même, ce roi bafoué qui t'écoute, ce vieux homme qui peut tout et qui en a vu tuer d'autres, je t'assure, et d'aussi attendrissants que toi, et qui est là, à se donner toute cette peine pour essayer de t'empêcher de mourir?*

C., pressing her arm. — Listen well to me. I am playing the bad role, of course, and you the good one. But don't take advantage of that too much, little bitch ... If I was a typical brutal tyrant, already a long time ago they would have torn out your tongue, stretched your limbs with pincers or thrown you into a clink. But you see in my eyes something which hesitates, you see that I let you talk instead of calling my soldiers; therefore, you don't give a damn, you attack as much as you can. Where do you want to get with that, little fury?

A. — Let me go. You hurt me in my arm with your hand.

C., pressing her more. — No. I, who I am the stronger one this way, I take my advantage, too.

A., giving a little cry. Ouch!

C., whose eyes laugh. This is perhaps what I should do after all, simply, twist your wrist, tear your hair like you do with girls in children's games. (He still is looking at her. He becomes serious again. He speaks to her, very close.) I am your uncle, that's understood, but we have no tender feelings for each other, in this family. This does not seem funny, however, this derided king who is listening to you, this old man who can do everything and who has seen others being killed, I assure you, and tender beings such as you, and who is here, taking all these efforts to prevent you from dying?

Although this passage is a clear case of a rude and fallacious emotional argument, it might be argued that Créon is still "cooperative" or "non-destructive" in one decisive respect, namely, his desperate will to save Antigone's life by intimidating her. Although not all brutal means can be justified by their noble end, in this case, where Antigone's life is at stake, they at least partially overlap with cooperative strategies of dis-

course. However, it has to be admitted that calling Créon's behaviour "impolite" or "rude" is far away from usage conventions concerning "first order impoliteness" (impoliteness) in the sense of Watts (2003).

4. Conclusion

Emotional arguments need not be fallacious nor are they always formulated in impolite ways. However, certain fallacious subtypes of emotional arguments involving appeals to negative emotions such as fear, hate or contempt tend to be formulated in an impolite way. As competitive strategies are employed both at the content level (fallaciousness) and at the interpersonal level (impoliteness), the non-cooperativity of these interactions is increased considerably. Accordingly, arguments which are both fallacious and impolite can be called "destructive arguments". It has also been shown, however, that sometimes even fallacious arguments involving positive emotions such as pity can be formulated in an impolite way. Finally, in certain exceptional cases even rude and fallacious arguments are not (totally) destructive, because they ultimately serve some vital interests of the opponent.

Acknowledgement

I would like to thank my colleagues Leona Cordery and Philip Herdina (English Department, University of Innsbruck) for correcting my English.

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