

John Benjamins Publishing Company



This is a contribution from *(Im)politeness and Moral Order in Online Interactions*.

Edited by Chaoqun Xie.

These materials were previously published in *Internet Pragmatics* 1:2 (2018)

© 2020. John Benjamins Publishing Company

This electronic file may not be altered in any way.

The author(s) of this article is/are permitted to use this PDF file to generate printed copies to be used by way of offprints, for their personal use only.

Permission is granted by the publishers to post this file on a closed server which is accessible to members (students and staff) only of the author's/s' institute, it is not permitted to post this PDF on the open internet.

For any other use of this material prior written permission should be obtained from the publishers or through the Copyright Clearance Center (for USA: www.copyright.com).

Please contact rights@benjamins.nl or consult our website: www.benjamins.com

Tables of Contents, abstracts and guidelines are available at www.benjamins.com

Impoliteness online

Hate speech in online interactions

Manfred Kienpointner

University of Innsbruck

This study provides an overview of the strategies and techniques of hate speech in online discourse (on online discourse or computer-mediated communication in general cf. e.g., Schwarzhaupt-Scholz 2004; Schmidt 2013; Dittler and Hoyer 2014; Seargeant and Tagg 2014). Based on a collection of online texts belonging to different genres (discussion forums, blogs, social media, tweets, homepages), this study will provide a qualitative analysis of destructively impolite utterances in online interactions. This analysis will make use of the standard typologies of impoliteness and their recent extensions (such as Culpeper 1996, 2005, 2011; Kienpointner 1997, 2008; Kleinke and Bös 2015), but some modifications and elaborations of these typologies will also be taken into account. Moreover, social, cultural and political reasons for the recent dramatic increase in hate speech in online interactions will be explored. Finally, the problem of how to deal with this destructive use of language will be briefly discussed and some possible solutions will be suggested (cf. Banks 2010).

Keywords: hate, hate speech, online impoliteness, intergroup rudeness, racism, moral order

1. Introduction

Hate is arguably the most destructive of all emotions (on the general importance of emotions for ‘doing (im)politeness’ cf. Kienpointner 2008; Langlotz and Locher 2017). Among others, this claim can be derived from the meaning of the respective lexical units, for instance English *hate*. And the destructive character of hate is also manifest in the meaning of lexemes in many other languages, as lexical field analyses show (cf., for example, German *Hass*, Latin *odium*, Ancient Greek *mîsos* and Turkish *nefret* as described in Kienpointner 1996, 1999, 2004).

The meaning of *hate*, as given by Webster (1993: 458), “intense hostility and aversion”, “distaste coupled with sustained ill will”, “a very strong dislike”, refers

to an emotion which, unlike anger, is not orientated towards justice, that is, it is not a justifiable reaction to or an adequate compensation for an earlier offence (cf. Aristotle (2002b: 86–87), *Nikomachische Ethik* 4.11; 1125b 25–1126a 5). When this compensation is achieved, anger normally ceases, as also the prototypical cognitive scenario for anger developed by Lakoff (1987: 397–398) shows.

Unlike prototypical anger, hate has the property of being persistent: “Anger is curable by time, hatred not” (cf. Aristotle (2002a: 82), *Rhetorik* 2.4.31; 1382a 7–8) and motivates a behaviour which causes permanent physical and/or mental damage to the hated persons or even leads to their extermination.

Moreover, hate is typically directed against whole groups rather than individuals, as again recognized by Aristotle (2002a: 82, *Rhetorik* 2.4.31; 1382a 4–6) and is incompatible with compassion. Of course, hate speech can also be exclusively directed towards an individual person, but here again, as with social groups, hate speech tends to deny this person his or her basic human rights or even intends his or her destruction. Therefore, the discursive manifestation of hate typically dehumanizes the verbally attacked person (cf. Section 1 for some authentic empirical examples). Ultimately, therefore, hate speech wants to destroy an individual or a social group, which is, at the same time, often a weak or powerless minority (e.g., LGBT people, Roma and Sinti, small indigenous communities, or Jewish/Muslim/Christian/Buddhist (etc.) religious minorities). These factors make hate speech an even more dangerous phenomenon.

Hate speech has become a disturbing and omnipresent worldwide phenomenon in online interactions, and is an important – although of course not the only – cause for the globally increasing number of hate crimes.¹ Internationally, online hate speech appears in in online media such as discussion forums, blogs, social media, tweets, online newspaper comments and homepages. Duggan (2014) reports the findings of a survey conducted with 2,839 U.S. informants, 40% of which have personally experienced some kind of online harassment. Of these, men are more likely to be called names or to be physically threatened, while women (especially young women) are more in danger of being stalked or to be sexually harassed. As far as the increase in hate speech is concerned, it is remarkable that 27% of the informants (38% of the women, 17% of the men) found their most recent experience with online harassment extremely or very upsetting. Banks (2010: 234) mentions an estimate coming from the Simon Wiesenthal Center, which “suggests that there are currently around 8,000 hate sites in existence”.

Hate speech can be defined more specifically as follows (Waldron 2012: 59): “assaults upon the dignity of the persons affected – “dignity”, in the sense of their

1. Cf. UN sources such as: <https://www.un.org/press/en/2016/gashc4182.doc.htm> (accessed 9 July 2017).

basic social standing, the basis of their recognition as social equals and as bearers of human rights and constitutional entitlements". It has in addition been aptly metaphorically characterized by Waldron (2012: 4) as "a sort of slow-acting poison". This definition has the advantage of clearly identifying hate speech and of distinguishing it from other types of competitive/aggressive communication, by pointing out its inherently racist, sexist and/or homophobic character. Hate speech denies human beings (collectively/individually) the right to be respected and protected, especially as far as basic human rights are concerned, and this "can become a world-defining activity" (Waldron 2012: 74).

Hate speech intersects, without being identical, with rude or impolite utterances. The latter can be used cooperatively, that is, cooperative rudeness/impoliteness is possible (cf. Kienpointner 1997: 362). On the other hand, although this is rarely the case, hate speech can be characteristically destructive, while maintaining a certain level of politeness.

In this context, one could mention the internet publication of the Starr Report on Bill Clinton's sexual affair with Monica Lewinsky in the year 1998, which contained sections with very explicit descriptions of sexual encounters in the Oval Office of the White House, and was published on the internet and received millions of clicks within a very short time. This could be called "the obsessive pursuit of a man" with the intention to create "a lynch mob mentality" (Gordon 2001: 111, quoted after Schwarzhaupt-Scholz 2004: 42), although this text was not at all formulated in a rude way: no swear words, no abusive vocabulary, no taboo words or other drastic means of expression having been used.

Rudeness will be understood here as follows (cf. Kienpointner 2008: 245; Culpeper 2011: 23; for the purposes of this study, I will use "rudeness" and "impoliteness" as synonyms, but cf. Culpeper (2011: 76–100) on usage differences of the English lexical units *rude*, *impolite*, *verbally aggressive*, *verbally abusive*, *harsh*, *ill-mannered* etc.):

Impoliteness/Rudeness is a kind of prototypically non-cooperative or competitive communicative behaviour

- which destabilizes the personal relationships of the interacting individuals and thus makes it more difficult to achieve the mutually accepted goal of the interaction or makes it difficult to agree on a mutually accepted goal in the first place;
- which, more particularly, creates or maintains an emotional atmosphere of mutual irreverence and antipathy, which primarily serves egocentric interests;
- which is partially determined by concepts of power, distance, emotional attitudes and cost-benefit scales which are generally accepted in a speech community

As far as online interaction is concerned, hate speech will also have to be distinguished from other kinds of online rudeness such as spamming, flaming, trolling and frape. These kinds of rudeness frequently occur in online interaction, but are not necessarily instances of hate speech, although flaming and trolling in many instances overlap with hate speech. “Flaming” can be defined as “Responding to a public message with the sort of bile and venom which is only appropriate when someone makes scandalous and unforgivable remarks regarding your mother” (Ihnatko 1997: 72, quoted after Schwarzhaupt-Scholz 2004: 68), and “Trolling” as “provocative messages or inappropriate, irrelevant questions” (Schwarzhaupt-Scholz 2004: 70).

A further type of online rudeness, which literally invades the other’s space, is hacking another person’s Twitter account and sending hoax messages from this account. Similarly, people can abuse another person’s Facebook account and post fake updates with false and/or offensive information. This practice is called “frape” (= “Facebook rape”) by Page (2014: 58). Not all of these frape cases are necessarily un-cooperative rudeness, because they can also be intended and experienced or interpreted as a playful joke (Page 2014: 59). Finally, “shitstorms” have to be mentioned here, that is, massive outbursts of negative criticism on social media. Shitstorm messages can be formulated in a very rude and frequently also hateful way. They can seriously affect the economic success or failure of enterprises (cf. Kleineberg 2014: 62–63).

After the ‘discursive turn’ (cf. Kádár and Haugh 2013: 36), politeness has usually been understood as an emergent phenomenon, which is greatly dependent on the discursive context (cf. Mills 2003; Watts 2003; Locher 2015). Therefore, it is important to take into account that there are several parameters and corresponding communicative strategies which distinguish (im)politeness in social media from face-to-face interaction. Among the parameters characterizing many (but not all) types of online interaction are the following (cf. Graham 2008: 285–286; Graham and Hardaker 2017: 787–790): the asynchronicity and the publicity of online interaction, the relation-orientatedness (as opposed to task-orientated interaction) and the focus on interaction (as opposed to a focus on declaration), which can be found in many genres of online discourse, the anonymity (or even manipulated identity) of the authors/senders, and the longevity of online messages. More specifically, those communicative parameters and strategies which are likely to enhance hate speech and the corresponding forms of (im)politeness in online interaction have to be considered. Especially anonymity, publicity and longevity deserve to be mentioned here (on the anonymity and publicity of impolite online comments written by newspaper readers cf. Neurauter-Kessels 2011: 195–198). Waldron (2012: 37–38) plausibly argues that “it is the enduring pres-

ence of the published word or the posted image that is particularly worrying in this connection”.

As far as anonymity is concerned, however, one has to distinguish between technical anonymity and social anonymity. For example, in discussion forums, people may remain anonymous from a technical perspective, but become relatively well-known socially because they post “under stable usernames which become associated with a history of online presence” (Perelmutter 2013: 77).

The small collection of authentic empirical examples of hate speech in online interaction I would like to analyse below comes from electronic corpora such as e-mail discussion forums (e.g., the *New York Times* forum focussing on the Clinton impeachment), blogs (e.g., German journalist Ronja von Rönne’s blog “Sudelheft”), tweets (e.g., tweets concerning “#ehfüralle”, that is, “marriage for everybody”; sent after the historical decision of the German parliament (June 30, 2017) to make same-sex marriage legal), social media postings (e.g., the “Pegida corpus” based on the Facebook account of *Pegida* = a right wing movement founded in Germany in the year 2014) and websites (e.g., the homepage of the French party *Front National*). Although I can only discuss a few examples in more detail below (cf. Section 1), I have looked at many more (actually, hundreds of) tokens of hate speech in the sources just mentioned, in order to guarantee the typicality of the examples. Moreover, I have taken examples from a variety of different languages spoken in three continents (Afrikaans, American English, German, French, Czech) for a better illustration of the global dimension of the problem.

Furthermore, I would like to remark that I have primarily chosen examples of online interaction which come from sources trying to reach relatively large, mixed audiences. It would be a rather trivial undertaking to show that extremist sources with messages primarily written for relatively homogeneous, predominantly racist audiences contain many instances of hate speech. Occasionally, however, I do analyse texts coming from such sources, for example, the discussion forum of the U.S. neo-Nazi organisation *Stormfront*.

Finally, I would like to add a few comments on the basis of the evaluation of hate speech as a most destructive phenomenon. Such evaluations, after all, are group- and/or culture-dependent. However, it would be deplorable to concede that the negative evaluation of hate speech (and the rude expressions often used to convey hate speech, for example, by an extremist racist group) evaporates as soon as you take the extremists’ point of view. This would amount to a relativist view of morality. There is no need, however, to accept such a relativist point of view. Spencer-Oatey and Kádár (2016) quote Haidt and Kesebir’s (2010) work on the moral foundations (the “moral order”; cf. also Kádár 2017) of cultures/sub-cultures/communities of practice in order to show that the moral judgments of social groups of different sizes may differ in many respects. However, there are

potentially universal foundations underlying these differing judgments. These foundations include (Spencer-Oatey and Kádár 2016: 82; cf. also Culpeper 2011: 36–39; Waldron 2012: 78):

1. “ingroup/loyalty”: “Concerns related to obligations of group membership, such as loyalty, self-sacrifice, and vigilance against betrayal”
2. “authority/respect”: “Concerns to social order and the obligations of hierarchical relationships, such as obedience, respect, and the fulfilment of role-based duties”
3. “harm/care”: “Concerns for the suffering of others, including virtues of caring and compassion”
4. “fairness/reciprocity”: “Concerns about unfair treatment, cheating, and more abstract notions of justice and rights”
5. “purity/sanctity”: “Concerns about physical and spiritual contagion, including virtues of chastity, wholesomeness, and control of desires”

At least some of these cross-culturally occurring moral foundations clearly seem to be violated by people using hate speech (cf. especially “harm/care” and “fairness/reciprocity”). In addition, the (increasing) cross-cultural acceptance of at least some basic human rights (e.g., the right to life or the protection from inhuman treatment or punishment) could be adduced as evidence supporting a severe criticism of hate speech. Similarly, research on presumptively universal basic values (cf. Schwartz et al. 2012, quoted by Spencer-Oatey and Kádár 2016: 88) points in the same direction (cf., however, Xie’s (2007: 259–262) criticism of universalism in (im)politeness research).

2. Analysis of examples

The classification of the examples I wish to discuss below is based on my own typology of rude utterances as presented in Kienpointner (1997: 261). However, I include some extensions and modifications as developed by Culpeper, Bousfield and Wichmann (2003), Culpeper (2005) and Kleinke and Bös (2015). These extensions and modifications concern the terminology of Culpeper, Bousfield and Wichmann’s (2003: 1554–1555) classification of impoliteness types, which is useful for stressing the difference between ‘benign’ ironic rudeness and ‘malign’ sarcastic rudeness, which is so typical for hate speech.

Moreover, Kleinke and Bös’ (2015: 50) additional distinction within intergroup rudeness, where not only the relationship between (a dominant) majority and (dominated) minorities in a given society/culture, but also the relationship between non-hierarchical in-groups and out-groups in forum discussions is taken

into account, is particularly relevant for the definition of hate speech and impoliteness in online interaction. In this respect, Schwarzhaupt-Scholz's (2004: 65–67) distinction between regulars, newbies, delurkers, and lurkers in online discussion and Perelmutter's (2013: 86–87) and Kleinke and Bös' (2015: 51) remarks on the forming of alliances within discussion forums are particularly relevant. And of course, in a certain way, the status of being an expert user (insider) or an inexperienced user (outsider) can establish new hierarchies in online discussion boards (cf. Graham 2008: 293; Haugh, Chang and Kádár 2015: 81). The revised typology can be summarized as follows (cf. Figure 1):




Figure 1. Typology of rudeness

According to this typology, hate speech in online interaction can most of the time be placed within non-cooperative, motivated, intergroup rudeness. Within this sub-class, hate speech can be classified according to the five types of impoliteness distinguished by Culpeper (1996): Bald on Record Impoliteness, Positive

Impoliteness, Negative Impoliteness, Sarcasm or Mock Politeness and Withholding of Politeness (cf. also the more detailed list in Culpeper 2011: 256).

Of course, there are also borderline cases. With very few potential exceptions (cf. e.g., *motherfucker* and the pertinent remarks by Culpeper 2011: 138–139), linguistic expressions are not (im)polite independently from their context. Therefore, even swear words, taboo words or other types of drastic expressions can be used cooperatively, for example, as instances of simulated rudeness (e.g., mock impoliteness/banter) or as forms of common interest rudeness (reactive rudeness or sociable rudeness).

For example, at least some instances of ‘flaming’ in internet fora (cf. Schwarzhaupt-Scholz 2004: 68) can be justified as appropriate reactions to previous provocations in a given context (reactive rudeness), if they are mainly intended to restore the balance of power in the interaction, which has been disturbed by the provocation. This is acceptable if their rudeness is not out of proportion in relation to the previous provocation and if they do not drastically escalate the conflict (cf. also the moral principle of fairness/reciprocity discussed by Spencer-Oatey and Kádár 2016: 82). Similarly, in certain contexts, as Perelmutter (2013: 83–84) has shown for certain Russian blogging communities, flaming can even contribute to sociability (sociable rudeness) in so far as alliances between similar-minded persons can be established precisely by flame wars.

As Deumert (2014) has shown for quite a number of cases of online interaction, that is, IRC (= Internet relay chat), Twitter and Facebook, often even superficially extremely rude utterances can be intended or interpreted as playful mock impoliteness (banter) or sociable rudeness. For example, in the following online text, which was written in Afrikaans. This text at the same time incorporates features of a mock-Somali accent in Afrikaans with stressed /a/-vowels at the end of words (hence: *masa/poesa/nayia* instead of *ma’s/ma se/poes/nayi*) and swear words/taboo words plus vulgar laughing acronyms (*lmj* = *lag my jas* ‘laughing myself horny’). However, the context (cf. e.g., the comment *funny stuff*) makes clear that this has not been taken as a real offence (Deumert 2014: 37):

- (1) *Soemalien sak nogal vi my af “Jou masa poesa jou naiya” lmj funny stuff*
 (May 2012)
 [“A Somali actually said to me: “You fuck your mother’s cunt” lmj funny stuff”]

Sometimes, however, and in some contexts, these criteria are not easily applicable. Whenever the existence of the underlying cooperativeness of superficially rude utterances can plausibly be doubted, this potentially cooperative rudeness can display features of destructive aggressiveness, which can be (mis)understood as hate speech (cf. Schiffrin 1984: 324).

Here is an example for a borderline case, this time more clearly verging towards hate speech, taken from the corpus of approximately 100,000 postings in the discussion forum set up by the *New York Times* during the impeachment procedure against U.S. President Bill Clinton from 5 October 1998 to 12 February 1999 (cf. Schwarzhaupt-Scholz 2004: 54, 71):

(2) *dogbert85* – 07 : 14pm Jan 14, 1999 EST (35752 of 36065)

The republicans only chance for redemption is to end this witchhunt quickly in the Senat [sic!], otherwise 2000 looms as their return to minority status. If there is an impeachment vote, it will be almost straight party line – 55 to 45. The repugs have already signed their death warrant in 2000. I say good riddance to bad rubbish. HA HA HA!!!!

(...)

heimbrock – 07 : 26pm Jan 14, 1999 EST (33762 of 36055)

Hey Dogbert seen where the FDA just ok ' ed new Doggie Downers. Put a few on your... errrrrrrr.. belly, suck ' em up and head back for your doghouse. Or go bite at tires.... on moving 18 wheelers

(New York Times, 14. Jan. 1999; FDA = Food and Drug Administration)

In this talk exchange, *dogbert85* provokes 'Clinton-haters' in the forum by using the insulting term *repug* for Republicans and the phraseme *good riddance to bad rubbish*. This is a clear case of non-cooperative intergroup rudeness, because *Dogbert 85* uses both severe attacks at the positive face of Clinton's opponents (inappropriate identity markers such as *repug*) and condescendingly denies his opponents any space for successful political moves, a rudeness strategy which negatively affects their negative face. Finally, and more typical for hate speech, *dogbert85* dehumanizes his political opponents by calling them *rubbish*.

Heimbrock hits back by abusing *dogbert85's* nickname, treating him like a dog in his answer, where he recommends the consumption of *Doggie Downers*, or suggests biting the tires of moving trucks. This is a very drastic counter attack at the positive face of *dogbert85*, who is metaphorically addressed as a dog and thus denied the status as a human being. Furthermore, this 'dog' is verbally sent to a certain death under a truck. This utterance, therefore, is so destructive that it could be plausibly called an example of hate speech. However, *Heimbrock's* severe attack at the positive and negative face of *dogbert85* (who is addressed as an animal, who is denied any serious alternative of free action as a human being, and whose personal space is invaded by a series of imperatives) can be partially justified by the previous provocations by *dogbert85*. Besides, it is not a fallacious generalization with reference to all Clinton followers, but is exclusively directed at *dogbert85* as a retaliation. However, this retaliation is so harsh that it could

plausibly be seen as an instance of hate speech (cf. a similarly abusive retaliation in the online discussion forum analysed by Graham 2008:300).

Clear cases of hate speech typically concern ethnic and/or religious or sexual minorities or out-groups. My first example of hate speech comes from a corpus of Facebook postings by followers of the Pegida (a right-wing and nationalist movement founded in Germany in 2014, called “Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes” = “Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the Christian Occident”). Approximately 300,000 Pegida postings have been collected as the “Pegida Corpus” by the German writers and political activists Gregor Weichbrodt and Hannes Bajohr.²

Having taken a closer look at a few hundred postings within this corpus, I conclude that they show differing degrees of (im)politeness and rational acceptability: Many of them are formulated in an impolite way, and quite a few can be considered as hate speech because of their tendency to overgeneralize and to dehumanize social groups. See, for example, the following text (Pegida corpus, p.50):

(3) 2014-12-17T18:30:08+0000

Schau dir doch diese zivilisationsfernen Barbaren in Saudi Arabien an. Alex. Hacken sich gegenseitig die Hände ab und verweigern ihren Frauen medizinische Hilfe, wenn sie gerade unverschleiert sind und ein männlicher Arzt vor der Tür steht. Man könnte noch 20 solche Beispiele aufzählen, unter anderem Kinderfickerei und Verfolgung von Schwulen. Das ist Faschismus oder aber so menschenverachtend, dass erst ein Wort dafür erfunden werden müsste, um diese Zustände angemessen zu beschreiben.

[“Look at those totally uncivilised barbarians in Saudi Arabia. Alex. [They] chop off each other’s hands and deny their women medical aid if they happen not to be veiled and a male doctor is standing at the door. You could go on enumerating 20 other such examples, among others the fucking of children and the persecution of gay people. That is fascism or so inhuman that a word has yet to be found in order to fittingly describe these conditions.”]

This text enumerates a list of human rights violations, some of which actually do occur in Saudi- Arabia (especially those committed against women, whose condition in Saudi Arabia is indeed deplorable): amputations as a form of legal punishment of repeated theft; the severe restriction of movement for women in public, which is possible only with the permission of a male relative acting as ‘guardian’ (Arabic *walī*); child marriage; and the flogging of or capital punishment for gay persons. However, what the author of this text posted in the year 2014 completely

2. See <http://oxoa.li/de/die-sprache-pegidas> (accessed 13 July 2017).

ignores is the slowly but steadily increasing list of improvements in this totalitarian legal regime, some of them already having been made before the author posted this text.

For example, the marriage of young girls is no longer common (and has recently come under attack even by the government-affiliated Saudi Human Rights Commission, which was already established in 2006). Saudi women are achieving higher levels of academic and professional education (Already in 2012, 64% of all bachelor degree graduates from Saudi universities were women). In the year 2011, women were already promised the right to vote (and be candidates) in municipal elections, and they were actually allowed to vote/to be elected at this level in 2015. Amputation, which is of course an inhuman and unacceptable form of punishment, seems to have become very rare as a form of legal punishment for repeated theft over the last few years.³

Much more problematic than this factual inaccuracy is the author's way of formulating his or her criticism: the use of the pejorative identity marker *Barbaren/barbarians*, the taboo word *Kinderfickerei/fucking of children*, the identification of the (admittedly totalitarian) Saudi regime with *Faschismus/fascism* and the description of the legal punishment of amputation in the case of theft as a general activity of chopping off each other's hands. These attacks at the positive face of all Saudi men (not only the Saudi government) are hyperbolic and overgeneralized. Moreover, Saudi men are supposed to be worse than fascists because a word for describing their acts, according to the author, has yet to be found. Therefore, the criticism of performing hate speech can be justified in this case.

Here is another clear case of hate speech. The recent decision (30 July 2017) of a great majority of the Bundestag, the Lower House of the German Parliament, to give same-sex couples equal marriage rights has received enthusiastic approval, but also sharp criticism.

The following Facebook posting⁴ shows a cartoon criticizing and ridiculing equal marriage rights for LGBT couples. It was published by the conservative-right German newspaper *Junge Freiheit* ("Young Liberty"). It had already first appeared in *Junge Freiheit* in 2015, long before the German Bundestag's decision. When this cartoon was posted again in 2017 it was deleted by Facebook a few days later (cf. Figure 2).

This cartoon conveys the multimodal message (with the poster on the wall announcing in German: *Ehe für alle; Anmeldung*, that is, "marriage for everybody; registration") that "marriage for everybody" would lead to many negative consequences, namely, not only the marriage of same-sex couples, but also marriage

3. On these facts cf. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saudi_Arabia (accessed 8 July 2017).

4. See <https://www.facebook.com/NullGender/> (accessed 8 July 2017).



Figure 2. Cartoon “Marriage for everybody”

with toys, pets, marriage as Islamic polygamy, marriage with one’s own football club (?) or with the club’s football fan articles (?), etc.

This type of causal argument tries to prove that a certain decision would lead not only to a first planned and actually intended consequence, but also to a long series of unintended and ever worse consequences, ultimately, a (social, legal and political) catastrophe (cf. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1983: 379–387; Kienpointner 1992: 342). The underlying argument scheme is called “Argument of Direction” or “Slippery Slope Argument” (cf. Walton 1992). Quite often, such arguments become fallacious because the probability of the more remote, unintended consequences actually happening is indeed very slight.

In a recent article on Facebook’s decision to delete the cartoon,⁵ the editor in chief of *Junge Freiheit*, Dieter Stein, complains about Facebook’s decision, which he criticizes as an unjustified restriction of the human right of freedom of speech. Moreover, Stein claims that the cartoon is politically harmless.

However, further online interaction on this issue shows that multimodal arguments (cf. Groarke, Palczewski and Godden 2016) such as this verbal and visual Slippery Slope Argument, due to the highly emotional impact of images, can stir very vehement emotions and motivate subsequent rude talk exchanges

5. See <https://jungefreiheit.de/politik/deutschland/2017/facebook-loescht-jf-karikatur-zur-ehe-fuer-alle/> (accessed 13 July 2017).

between those in favour and those against same-sex marriage. For example, the German blogger, tweeter, author and journalist Ronja von Rönne wrote an article for the German newspaper WELT (27 June 2017), where she severely criticizes those who are against “marriage for everybody”. She introduces this article with the following, partially quite offensive remarks:⁶

- (4) *Es gibt keinen Grund, Menschen, die die „Ehe für alle“ ablehnen, noch irgendwie höflich zu behandeln. Alle, die ihr Kreuz am Wahltag davon abhängig machen, ob zwei Kilometer weiter Lea und Lina ein Baby adoptieren dürfen, sind nichts anderes als wahlweise gründlich ignorant oder schlicht böseartig.*

[“There is no reason to treat persons who refuse ‘marriage for everybody’ in a polite way. All those who put their cross on the ballot-paper on election day, dependent on whether one mile away Lea and Lina are allowed to adopt a baby, are nothing other than either deeply ignorant or simply malicious”]

This is, of course, an extremely provocative attack on the positive face of persons who are opposed to marriage for everybody. They are denied basic communicative rights such as being treated in a polite way, their positive face is severely damaged because of von Rönne’s statement that they either lack basic cognitive capacities or they have a very bad character. It is also an overgeneralization and thus comes close to hate speech. So it comes as no surprise that von Rönne, who is also a regular tweeter (@sudelheft), received very aggressive tweets after the publication of this article. Some of these tweets, however, go even much further and thus can no longer be classified as potentially cooperative reactive rudeness, which tries to restore a balance, but are clear instances of hate speech.

Here are some examples of the 59 retweets which were “second pair parts” (Schegloff 2007:13) in the respective adjacency pairs/speech act sequences opened by Rönne’s provocation.⁷

The first one, posted by Karl Krause (cf. Figure 3), could be justified as a non-escalating counter-attack (hence, as cooperative reactive rudeness), which simply tries to make clear that persons who deny others the right to be treated politely cannot complain if they themselves are the victim of impolite attacks (cf. also Krause’s use of mild irony (“Schätzchen”/“sweetie”) and his mitigating use of the friendly emoticons “winkey” and “throwing a kiss”):

Krause is thus asking for reciprocal rights of (un)fairness, invoking a specific version of the “rule of justice” of argumentation theory (cf. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1983: 294; Kienpointner 1992: 294–299; Waldron 2012: 82–83; cf.

6. See <https://www.welt.de/debatte/kommentare/article165953729/Anderen-ihr-Glueck-verbieten-das-darf-man-nicht.html> (accessed 13 July 2017).

7. See <https://twitter.com/Sudelheft/status/879603795310915584> (accessed 13 July 2017).



[Sweetie, you know, however, that (im)politeness is not a one way street! Hence, don't complain again afterwards, if somebody strikes back!]

Figure 3. Counterattack tweet

also the moral principle of fairness/reciprocity, mentioned by Culpeper 2011: 36; Spencer-Oatey and Kádár 2016: 82).

Other tweets are escalating, to say the least (but note that escalation alone is not a necessary sign of hate speech, cf. Perelmutter 2013: 84–86). I have to content myself with reproducing the running text of one of these tweets:

- (5) Waldenmonk @waldenmonk Jun 27 Replying to @sudelheft
Oh, ein neo-stalinistischer Tweet.
 – *Oder doch besser, LBGT-Nazi Tweet?*
Oder einfach nur „größenwahnsinnig“?
 [Oh, a neo-stalinist Tweet.
 – Or even better, LBGT-Nazi Tweet?
 Or simply “a megalomaniac”?]

Waldenmonk does not simply “strike back”, something which would be expected according to Karl Krause, who is right in this respect. Instead, Waldenmonk places von Rönne in the category of dictatorship (Stalinism, Nazism) and insanity. At the same time, LBGT persons are closely linked to Nazis. These are devastating attacks at the positive face of von Rönne and LBGT people. They are out of proportion in relation to von Rönne's provocation. Both at the individual level (Ronja von Rönne) and the collective level (LBGT people), therefore, this is an especially destructive instance of hate speech.

The examples analysed so far most of the time contained swear words, taboo words, unhedged imperatives, or capital letters as the online equivalent of screaming, and other obviously impolite ways of expression. The following examples show rather more subtle and indirect strategies of impoliteness (“off record” strategies in terms of Brown and Levinson 1987: 211ff.; “implicational impoliteness” according to Culpeper 2011: 155–156), with sarcasm being the most destructive strategy. This also differs from the previously analysed examples, in so far, as here the prevailing off record strategies concerned metaphor and/or hyperbole rather than sarcasm.

On January 18, 2010, an article written by the Czech journalist Václav Vlk sr. appeared in the online version of *Lidové Noviny*, one of the most widely read Czech newspapers. In this article, Vlk sharply criticizes the feminist movement in general, comparing its suggestions for gender-fair language with the authoritarian discourse of the former Czechoslovakian communist regime. Moreover, Vlk focuses his attack on feminist linguistics, and especially on Janá Valdrová, a prominent Czech feminist linguist.

Now Vlk completely refrains from using on record strategies of rudeness. He rather prefers to rely on sarcastic ways of expressions, especially by coining neologisms such as *ženomuža* (*ženo-muž-a*, lit. “woman-man-FEM”; “FEM” stands for the Czech feminine suffix *-a*) for designating the alleged ideal of feminists, namely, a hybrid person beyond male and female gender.

His most subtle and at the same time most malicious method of using sarcasm is his use of neuter for designating Valdrová (that is, coining the neologism *Valdro* with the neuter suffix *-o*). Thus Vlk denies Valdrová her status of being a woman, verbally reducing her to a thing (combining this neologism with yet another one, *vědco*, which literally means “scientist-NEUTER”, that is, “the scientist-thing”, instead of appropriate and usual *vědkyně*, “scientist-FEM”, that is, “woman-scientist”):

- (6) “*Dotyčné vědco Valdro*” je mimořádně aktivní – viz semináře, články, vědecká činnost, ale dokonce se pustila v článku v LN na pole, řekl bych, literární. Takzvané odborné články, které píše dotyčné “Valdro”, jsou jazykově velice průměrné. Abychom byli slušní, prosím.

[“The aforementioned scientist-thing Valdro’ is extraordinarily active – that is, seminars, articles, scientific activities, but in LN (= *Lidové Noviny*) she even moved to the, let’s say, literary field. So-called scholarly papers, which are written by the aforementioned ‘Valdro’, are linguistically seen as being very mediocre. To put it mildly.”]

The fact that Vlk denies Valdrová her female identity by changing her name from the usual female suffix *-ova* to a neuter form *Valdro* with the neuter suffix *-o* and his equally sarcastic comment on her alleged mediocre style of writing papers turn this superficially rather innocent passage into a particularly destructive example of hate speech (on gender-related ideologies of (im)politeness, cf. Kienpointner and Stopfner 2017: 71–72, 77–78).

It also stands in a long patriarchal tradition of denying critical and/or powerful and/or successful women their femininity. In German (cf. Nübling 2014), with its three determiners *der* (DET-masculine), *die* (DET-feminine), *das* (DET-neuter), the determiner often marks the gender of the noun, which frequently lacks a gender-marking suffix of its own. It is not surprising that Angela Merkel,

the current Chancellor of Germany, has been called *das Merkel* (“DET-neuter Merkel”) by her political enemies. We see this, for example, in the campaign slogan *Das Merkel muss weg!* (“DET-neuter Merkel has to leave!”), which was the title of a video produced by the German private TV network *Krosta TV* on March 9, 2016.⁸

Nübling (2014: 212) has shown with the help of corpus searches that such derogatory “DET-neuter + family name” utterances (e.g., *das Merkel*, *das Schäuble* = Wolfgang Schäuble, the current German Minister of Finance) occur much less frequently (if at all) in relation to male politicians and plausibly concludes (2014: 205) that “neuter gender surnames have extremely aggressive and derogative connotations”.

In standard German, designating a woman with a neuter determiner makes her either a girl (cf. *das Mädchen* “DET-neuter girl”) or triggers pejorative connotations of morally dubious women (cf. *das Luder* “DET-neuter bitch”) or connotations of inanimate objects (cf. *das Haus* “DET-neuter house”, *das Auto* “DET-neuter car”, *das Schiff* “DET-neuter ship”). In this respect, this impoliteness strategy goes even further than the use of depersonalizing third person references instead of direct, second person address forms as analysed by Neurauter-Kessels (2011: 202–207).

My next example is another illustration of how hate speech can avoid being conspicuously and aggressively rude without being any less offensive and dangerous. The means of verbalization here, however, are different from those applied by Vlk/Krosta TV: In this case, it is intentional vagueness which invites hate-inducing inferences (cf. Brown and Levinson 1987: 226 on the off record strategies of “Be vague” and “Over-Generalize”). The example is taken from an election campaign speech given on March 17, 2017 by Marine Le Pen, at that time candidate of the French party *Front National* for the presidency of France.

This speech (*La Citoyenneté: “The citizenship”*) can be downloaded from the official website of *Front National*, of which Marine Le Pen is currently the leader.⁹

One of the major issues of Le Pen’s speech is French citizenship. Le Pen makes it very clear that, if elected, she would introduce much more severe restrictions for granting citizenship to legal immigrants and that she would send back illegal or criminal immigrants to their former home countries.

Now, in order to justify this standpoint, Le Pen does not attack the positive face of all or the majority of immigrants directly. She explicitly refers to a radical

8. See <http://www.krosta.tv/krosta-tv-aktion-das-merkel-muss-weg-und-dann/> (accessed 13 July 2017); for further, extremely sexist uses of *das Merkel* cf. Nübling (2014: 208–210).

9. See <http://www.frontnational.com/videos/conference-presidentielle-n4-la-citoyennete/> (accessed 9 July 2017).

section (*une partie*) of the immigrants (that is, to Islamists, jihadists, terrorists) and their children, who, according to Le Pen, have declared war on France ([...] *sont entrés en guerre contre la France*) and will sooner or later push France into a civil war, and this future civil war is no longer a mere fantasy (*la perspective de la guerre civile n'est plus un fantasme*).

Not being precise about just how big this radical section is, how many persons it comprises and whether the other part (the majority?) of the immigrants is indirectly responsible or guilty for letting the radical part do whatever it wants, makes this passage a subtle and especially malicious example of hate speech. It triggers the inference that some (many?) of the immigrants are enemies/soldiers, who have declared a (civil) war on France. And everybody is supposed to know what you have to expect from an invading army and what you should do to prevent the invasion of incoming soldiers (cf. Waldron 2012: 56 on similar cases). Here is the text:

- (7) [...] *quand, dans les années 2000, une partie des migrants, ou de leurs enfants, sont entrés en guerre contre la France, il est alors impossible de nier qu'il y a un problème [...]*

Nous sommes là face à une escroquerie doublée d'une manipulation. Escroquerie, parce que depuis quarante ans au moins, tout observateur lucide et objectif voit monter les problèmes et que, depuis trop d'années, d'intimidations en intimidations, et d'agressions antifrançaises en actes terroristes, la perspective de la guerre civile n'est plus un fantasme.

[“[...] when, in the years after 2000, a section of the immigrants, or of their children, entered into war against France, it's impossible to deny that there is a problem [...].

We are dealing here with a case of fraud worsened by manipulation. Fraud, because for at least 40 years every lucid and objective observer has been watching the problems growing and for too many years, from one intimidation to the next, from anti-French aggressions to terrorist acts, so that the perspective of a civil war is no longer a fantasy.”]

This sort of intimidation by insinuation, of “calculated ambivalence” (cf. Wodak 2015: 60–63) by right wing populist politicians, who want to become mainstream political leaders is hardly any less dangerous than the open and direct aggressiveness of hate speech, formulated by extremist racists of the neo-Nazi type. The latter is illustrated by the following passage, a text posted in the internet forum on the homepage of *Stormfront*.¹⁰

10. See <https://www.stormfront.org/forum/t1218385/> (accessed 9 July 2017).

- (8) Posting by HMArcRoyal, Birmingham, UK; 9 July 2017, 10:44 AM:

Why is Nelson Mandela praised?

He was an Anti-White Extremist that supported the killing of whites in South Africa. Apartheid was messed up, sure, but the current situation is more evil than Apartheid was. Whites never slaughtered blacks en masse in SA, and living conditions were higher on average. Why is such a person praised solely for being black, yet a white would be demonized in the reverse situation?

Never forget September 11th, 1683, when the heroic German-Polish relief force arrived to repel the Turk invaders at Vienna.

Never forget Charles Martel.

The only good Commie is a dead Commie. The only good Zionist is a dead Zionist. The only good Muslim is a dead Muslim. What do these 3 things have in common? The Jew is behind them all.

Here you find fact-free accusations against Nelson Mandela, who never supported violence against people as a means of political battle, and who was the one who made interracial reconciliation possible after the change of power in South Africa in 1994. Moreover, you find hate speech of the most primitive sort, with fascist and racist and, more specifically, anti-semitic slogans (in the form of the originally racist proverb *The only good Indian is a dead Indian*) simply rejecting political opponents (called *Commies* with a derogatory denomination), Jews/Zionists and Muslims the most basic of all human rights, the right to life. This is hate speech at its worst.

3. Reasons for and strategies against hate speech

As the examples have illustrated, in the majority of cases anonymity seems to be a basic factor which additionally motivates people to produce rude utterances and/or hate speech. The absence of the insulted person in online interaction, together with the protection from sanctions due to anonymity, seems to make it easier to become verbally aggressive in a particularly destructive way than in a face-to-face interaction. Publicity, that is, the interaction with an audience largely unknown to the sender of hate messages, could also be a feature of online interaction which enhances hate speech. Of course, many other, longstanding political, social and economic problems promote the omnipresence of hate speech: nationalism, sexism, racism, social pressure within the peer group, the growing polarization between political parties, the looking for a scapegoat for one's frustration because of unemployment or poverty of the working poor, lack of knowledge, manipulation by populist politicians, etc.

What can be done against hate speech? The omnipresence and danger of this phenomenon has motivated different groups of political protagonists to become active against hate speech. It seems, indeed, to be necessary that different strategies enacted by various groups of people are combined to fight hate speech:

1. The state(s): Political authorities and the legislative assemblies have to pass bills and to put them into practice, which makes it (much) more difficult for the authors of hate speech to continue with their destructive activity: for example, by enacting more severe sanctions for hate speech (cf. Banks 2010: 236). As of May 2017, the Council of Europe's Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime (adopted in 2002) has been signed by 40 states and ratified by 27 states (excluding, however, the U.S.A.). Waldron (2012: 47, 95–96, 111–116) provides plausible arguments against the objection that these laws would endanger the basic human right of freedom speech. After all, the *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights* (which was adopted by the General Assembly of the UN 1966 and came into effect in 1976) already stated clearly in its Articles 19(3) and 20(2) that the right of free expression of one's opinion is subject to some well-established restrictions (cf. also Bosch 2016: 381, fn. 3).
2. The media: Journalists and other representatives of traditional and new media can contribute critical reports about hate messages in the internet, and can elaborate their own codes of conduct ("Netiquette", "FAQs"; cf. Graham 2008: 301–303) in media-based discussion forums. Both has been done, for example, by the Austrian quality newspaper *Salzburger Nachrichten*, where its editor-in-chief Manfred Perterer announced in a critical editorial on hate speech that his newspaper will make it obligatory for all people posting messages on its discussion forum to provide their real and full names.¹¹
3. Business and enterprises: Due to the pressure of NGOs such as *Sleeping Giants*,¹² big enterprises such as *Air France*, *BMW*, *Ford*, *Kellogg's*, *Nestlé*, *Oxfam*, *Rewe*, *Renault*, *Visa*, a total of some 2,000 enterprises, have announced that they no longer place online advertisements on websites where hate speech is posted and not deleted immediately. Internet giants such as *Facebook*, *Google*, *YouTube* and *Twitter* have announced that they are taking action towards the prompt detection and deletion of hate messages (cf. Banks 2010: 238).

11. See *Salzburger Nachrichten*, 23 March 2017, p. 1; cf. similar procedures of the Swiss newspaper *Tagesanzeiger*, reported by Neuraüter-Kessels 2011: 196).

12. See https://twitter.com/slpng_giants?lang=de (accessed 13 July 2017).

4. The people: Ordinary people can start initiatives, set up NGOs and put pressure on politicians and businesses to face the big problem of the omnipresence of hate speech. For example, ZARA, an Austrian anti-racist grass-root organization, provides annual critical reports on racist language use, including online hate speech (cf. e.g., Zara 2016), and has founded Counter-ACT!,¹³ a website which provides individuals with information and tools with which they can become active against hate speech in the internet. Last but not least, creative and humorous activities against hate speech can be enacted by determined groups of citizens (cf. Brodnig 2016).

Taken together, these strategies justify a certain optimism that hate speech is in no way undefeatable.

4. Conclusions

Hate, as well as its verbal manifestation, hate speech, will continue to be a great problem on a worldwide scale in our future. Although hate speech often overlaps with (non-cooperative) rudeness, it is worse than rudeness because it denies (groups of) human beings their basic human rights, often by dehumanizing them. In this study, I have tried to describe and analyse a great variety of types and subtypes of hate speech in online interaction, mostly on the verbal, but also on the visual level. A better knowledge of the strategies and subtleties of hate speech can contribute to a greater awareness and critical self-protection against this dangerous, “slow acting poison” (Waldron 2012: 4). Moreover, I have discussed a series of private and political measures which can be taken against this evil with a great deal of hope for ultimate success. Hate speech can be defeated peacefully.

References

- Aristotle. 2002a. *Rhetorik* [Rhetoric] (trans. and comm. by Christoph Rapp). Berlin: Akademie Verlag.
- Aristotle. 2002b. *Nikomachische Ethik* [Nicomachean Ethics] (trans. and comm. by Ursula Wolf). Darmstadt: Wiss. Buchgesellschaft.
- Banks, James. 2010. “Regulating hate speech online.” *International Review of Law, Computers & Technology* 24(3): 233–239. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13600869.2010.522323>

13. See www.counteract.or.at (accessed 13 July 2017).

- Bosch, Nikolaus. 2016. "Hassbotschaften und Hetze im Internet als Aufforderung zu Straftaten?" [Hate messages and rabble-rousing in the internet as incitement to criminal offences?]. *Juristische Ausbildung* 4: 381–389.
- Brodnig, Ingrid. 2016. *Hass im Netz* [Hate on the Net]. Wien: Brandstätter.
- Brown, Penelope, and Stephen C. Levinson. 1987. *Politeness: Some Universals in Language Usage*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511813085>
- Culpeper, Jonathan. 1996. "Towards an anatomy of impoliteness." *Journal of Pragmatics* 25(3): 349–367. [https://doi.org/10.1016/0378-2166\(95\)00014-3](https://doi.org/10.1016/0378-2166(95)00014-3)
- Culpeper, Jonathan. 2005. "Impoliteness and entertainment in the television quiz show: *The Weakest Link*." *Journal of Politeness Research* 1(1): 35–72. <https://doi.org/10.1515/jplr.2005.1.1.35>
- Culpeper, Jonathan. 2011. *Impoliteness: Using Language to Cause Offence*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511975752>
- Culpeper, Jonathan, Derek Bousfield, and Anne Wichmann. 2003. "Impoliteness revisited: With special reference to dynamic and prosodic aspects." *Journal of Pragmatics* 35(10–11): 1545–1579. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0378-2166\(02\)00118-2](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0378-2166(02)00118-2)
- Deumert, Ana. 2014. "The performance of a ludic self on social network(ing) sites." In *The Language of Social Media*, ed. by Philip Seargeant, and Caroline Tagg, 23–45. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137029317_2
- Dittler, Ullrich, and Michael Hoyer (eds.). 2014. *Social Network – Die Revolution der Kommunikation* [Social Network: The Revolution of Communication]. München: Kopaed.
- Duggan, Maeve. 2014. *Online Harassment*. Washington, D.C.: Pew Research Center. <http://www.pewinternet.org/2014/10/22/online-harassment/> (accessed 11 July 2017).
- Gordon, Robert W. 2001. "Legalizing outrage." In *Aftermath. The Clinton Impeachment and the Presidency in the Age of Political Spectacle*, ed. by Leonard V. Kaplan, and Beverly I. Moran, 97–112. New York: New York University Press.
- Graham, Sage L. 2008. "A manual for (im)politeness?: The impact of the FAQ in an electronic community of Practice." In *Impoliteness in Language*, ed. by Derek Bousfield, and Miriam A. Locher, 281–304. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.
- Graham, Sage L., and Claire Hardaker. 2017. "(Im)politeness in digital communication." In *Palgrave Handbook of Linguistic (Im)politeness*, ed. by Jonathan Culpeper, Michael Haugh, and Dániel Z. Kádár, 785–814. London: Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-37508-7_30
- Groarke, Leo, Catherine H. Palczewski, and David Godden. 2016. "Navigating the visual turn in argument." *Argumentation and Advocacy* 52(4): 217–235. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00028533.2016.11821871>
- Haidt, Jonathan, and Selin Kesebir. 2010. "Morality." In *Handbook of Social Psychology*, ed. by Susan T. Fiske, Daniel T. Gilbert, and Gardner Lindzey, 797–852. Hoboken, N. J.: Wiley. <https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470561119.socpsy002022>
- Haugh, Michael, Wei-Lin Melody Chang, and Dániel Z. Kádár. 2015. "'Doing deference': Identities and relational practices in Chinese online discussion boards." *Pragmatics* 25(1): 73–98. <https://doi.org/10.1017/prag.25.1.04hau>
- Ihnatko, Andy. 1997. *Cyberspeak: An Online Dictionary*. New York: Random House.
- Kádár, Dániel Z. 2017. *Politeness, Impoliteness and Ritual: Maintaining the Moral Order in Interpersonal Interaction*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1017/9781107280465>

- Kádár, Dániel Z., and Michael Haugh. 2013. *Understanding Politeness*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139382717>
- Kienpointner, Manfred. 1992. *Alltagslogik* [Everyday Logic]. Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog.
- Kienpointner, Manfred. 1996. "Structural semantics and Latin linguistics." In *Aspects of Latin*, ed. by Hannah Rosén, 603–617. Innsbruck: Verlag des Instituts für Sprachwissenschaft.
- Kienpointner, Manfred. 1997. "Varieties of rudeness: Types and functions of impolite utterances." *Functions of Language* 4(2): 251–287. <https://doi.org/10.1075/foL.4.2.05kie>
- Kienpointner, Manfred. 1999. "Zum Wortfeld 'Liebe-Haß' im Altgriechischen." [On the lexical field 'love-hate' in Ancient Greek]. In *Studia Celtica et Indogermanica* [Celtic and Indo-European Studies], ed. by Peter Anreiter, and Erzsébet Jerem, 163–177. Budapest: Archäolingua.
- Kienpointner, Manfred. 2004. "Metaphern für Emotionen: Universalien oder Kulturspezifika?" [Metaphor for emotion: Universality or cultural specificity?]. In *Translation in der globalen Welt und neue Wege in the Sprach- und Übersetzungsausbildung* [Translation in the Global world and New ways in Language and Translation Training], ed. by Lew N. Zybatow, 61–91. Bern: Peter Lang.
- Kienpointner, Manfred. 2008. "Impoliteness and emotional arguments." *Journal of Politeness Research* 4(2): 243–265. <https://doi.org/10.1515/JPLR.2008.012>
- Kienpointner, Manfred, and Maria Stopfner. 2017. "Ideologies of politeness." In *Palgrave Handbook of Linguistic (Im)politeness*, ed. by Jonathan Culpeper, Michael Haugh, and Dániel Z. Kádár, 61–87. London: Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-37508-7_4
- Kleineberg, Christoph. 2014. "Shitstorm-Attacken: Digitaler Orkan oder Sturm im Wasserglas." [Shitstorm attacks: Digital hurricane or storm in a teacup]. In *Social Network – Die Revolution der Kommunikation* [Social Network: The Revolution of Communication], ed. by Ullrich Dittler, and Michael Hoyer, 61–70. München: Kopaed.
- Kleinke, Sonja, and Birte Bös. 2015. "Intergroup rudeness and the metapragmatics of its negotiation in online discussion fora." *Pragmatics* 25(1): 47–71. <https://doi.org/10.1075/prag.25.1.03kle>
- Lakoff, George. 1987. *Women, Fire and Dangerous Things*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. <https://doi.org/10.7208/chicago/9780226471013.001.0001>
- Langlotz, Andreas, and Miriam A. Locher. 2017. "(Im)politeness and emotion." In *Palgrave Handbook of Linguistic (Im)politeness*, ed. by Jonathan Culpeper, Michael Haugh, and Dániel Z. Kádár, 287–322. London: Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-37508-7_12
- Locher, Miriam A. 2015. "Interpersonal pragmatics and its link to (im)politeness research." *Journal of Pragmatics* 86: 5–10. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pragma.2015.05.010>
- Mills, Sara. 2003. *Gender and Politeness*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511615238>
- Neurauter-Kessels, Manuela. 2011. "Im/polite reader responses on British online news sites." *Journal of Politeness Research* 7(2): 187–214. <https://doi.org/10.1515/jplr.2011.010>
- Nübling, Damaris. 2014. "Das Merkel – Das Neutrum bei weiblichen Familiennamen als derogatives Genus?" [DET-Neuter Merkel – The neuter of female family names as a derogative gender?]. In *Linguistik der Familiennamen* [Linguistics of Family Names], ed. by Friedhelm Debus, Rita Heuser, and Damaris Nübling, 205–232. Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag.

- Page, Ruth. 2014. "Hoaxes, hacking and humour: Analysing impersonated identity on social network sites." In *The Language of Social Media*, ed. by Philip Seargeant, and Caroline Tagg, 46–64. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137029317_3
- Perelman, Chaim, and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca. 1983. *Traité de l'argumentation* [Treatise on Argumentation]. Bruxelles: Éditions de l'Université de Bruxelles.
- Perelmutter, Renee. 2013. "Klassika zhanra: The flamewar as a genre in the Russian blogosphere." *Journal of Pragmatics* 45(1): 74–89.
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pragma.2012.10.006>
- Schegloff, Emanuel. 2007. *Sequence Organization in Interaction*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511791208>
- Schiffirin, Deborah. 1984. "Jewish argument as sociability." *Language in Society* 13(3): 311–335.
<https://doi.org/10.1017/S0047404500010526>
- Schmidt, Jan-Hinrik. 2013. *Social Media*. Wiesbaden: Springer.
<https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-02096-5>
- Schwarzhaupt-Scholz, Dorothea. 2004. *Impeachment im digitalen Zeitalter* [Impeachment in the Digital Age]. München: Fischer.
- Spencer-Oatey, Helen, and Dániel Z. Kádár. 2016. "The bases of (im)politeness evaluations: Culture, the moral order and the East-West debate." *East Asian Pragmatics* 1(1): 73–106.
<https://doi.org/10.1558/eap.v1i1.29084>
- Waldron, Jeremy. 2012. *The Harm in Hate Speech*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
<https://doi.org/10.4159/harvard.9780674065086>
- Walton, Douglas N. 1992. *Slippery Slope Arguments*. Oxford: Clarendon.
- Watts, Richard J. 2003. *Politeness*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
<https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511615184>
- Webster. 1993. *Webster's New Encyclopaedic Dictionary*. New York: Black Dog & Leventhal.
- Wodak, Ruth. 2015. *Politics of Fear*. London: Sage.
- Xie, Chaoqun. 2007. "Controversies about politeness." In *Traditions of Controversy*, ed. by Marcelo Dascal, and Han-liang Chang, 249–266. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
<https://doi.org/10.1075/cvs.4.17xie>
- Zara. 2016. *Rassismus Report* [Racism Report]. Wien: Verein Zara.