Sonderdruck aus

Corpora and the History of English

Papers Dedicated to
MANFRED MARKUS
on the Occasion
of His Sixty-Fifth Birthday

Edited by
CHRISTIAN MAIR
REINHARD HEUBERGER
in Collaboration with
JOSEF WALLMANNSBERGER

Universitätsverlag
WINTER
Heidelberg
2006

Emotion terms in the recent history of the English language

Manfred Kienpointner

1. Introduction: semantic theory and lexical fields

In this article, I would like to sketch the present-day meaning and recent semantic history of English emotion terms within the semantic micro-field "love-hate-anger".[1] The empirical data have been taken from approximately 1700 to 2000. This is the fourth period in the historical development of English, according to its division into Old English (450-1100), Middle English (1100-1500), Early Modern English (1500-1700) and Modern English (1700ff.; cf. Hughes 2000: 12ff.; Görlach 2002: 17).

As far as the theoretical framework is concerned, I wish to follow lexical field theory as developed by Coseriu and Geckeler (1981), whose approach I still consider to be the most elaborate within structural semantics. However, I will also take into account related approaches (e.g. Greimas 1966, Lyons 1977, Pottier 1992, Lehrer 1998) and other recent developments within semantic theory. Here especially Wierzbicka's "Natural Semantic Metalanguage" (cf. Wierzbicka 1985, 1999, Goddard 2004) and the cognitive approach developed by Lakoff, Johnson and Kövecses (cf. Lakoff 1987, Lakoff/ Johnson 1980, Kövecses 2002) deserve to be mentioned. These frameworks will be critically discussed and a number of conclusions will be drawn concerning the solution of central problems of structural semantics. Among these vexed problems are the demarcation of semantic fields, the distinction between core meaning and contextual meaning and the problem of choosing between differing formats of meta-linguistic language.

The resulting theoretical insights will be used to establish a selection of more than 100 nouns and verbs for further examination (section 2). Within the limits of this paper, of course, they cannot be described in detail. But I wish to deal with the semantic properties of at least some central units of the micro-field "love-hate-anger" and to make some suggestions for the description of other words and give the overall semantic structure of the field. This description will refer to both the present meaning(s) of lexical items and the diachronic changes which the micro-field has undergone. With the help of the Oxford English Dictionary (OED; second edition on CD-ROM[2]) and other corpus-based dictionaries of contemporary English, for example, the Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English (LDOCE 2003) or the Collins COBUILD English Dictionary (COBUILD 1987), the semantic development within the last three centuries

[1] Micro-fields such as "love-anger-hate" are subsections of larger lexical fields ("macro-fields") such as "emotions". A lexical field is here defined as a paradigm of lexical items which together divide a semantic zone into structural units, which are opposed to each other by the presence or absence of semantic features (cf. Coseriu 1967: 294).

[2] I would like to thank my colleague Reinhard Heuberger, English Department, Univ. of Innsbruck, for generous and highly valuable help with the use of this CD-ROM. For information about the current usage of English emotion terms I would like to thank my colleague Leona Cordery, English Department, Univ. of Innsbruck.

will be outlined. Finally, in section 3, a few remarks will be made which go beyond the 'classical' approaches of structural semantics.

One of the most difficult theoretical problems of lexical field theory concerns the number of lexical items within a field. How many English nouns and verbs belong to the micro-field "love-hate-anger"? This seemingly simple question does not have a clear-cut answer, because the lexicon of a language is a highly heterogeneous set of words.[3] Therefore, words cannot be included in or excluded from a lexical field according to some easily applied algorithm. Coseriu's answer is that in order to arrive at a "homogeneous object of investigation" (Coseriu/ Geckeler 1981: 47), a set of seven methodological distinctions has to be made within lexical field description:

1. the distinction between extralinguistic reality (objects) and language (words),
2. the distinction between language (primary language) and meta-language,
3. the distinction between synchrony and diachrony,
4. the distinction between technique of discourse and repeated discourse
5. the distinction between architecture of language and structure of language
6. the distinction between type, system, norm and discourse
7. the distinction between signification (meaning) and designation (reference).

Among these, the first distinction is possibly the most difficult but at the same time the most indispensable one. We have to distinguish between scientific terminology and popular nomenclatures of plants, animals and artefacts, which are based on extra-linguistic reality and (scientific or popular) knowledge about reality, and structures of language, which are based on knowledge about language (cf. Coseriu 1973: 26ff., Lyons 1977: I 287ff.). Words with a meaning which is unknown by non-expert speakers of a natural language have to be excluded. As far as the micro-field of "love, hate and anger" is concerned, lexical items from the fields of philosophy, political science, psychoanalysis or psychopathology such as *agape*, *altruism*, *caritas*, *eros*, *libido*, *masochism*, *narcissism*, *necrophilia*, *misanthropy*, *philanthropy*, *sadism*, *xenophobia*, *zoophilia* would seem to be candidates for exclusion on this criterion (cf. also the long list of *phobias* in Roget 1992: 101ff.). However, some of them, for example, *altruism* (according to the OED coined as *altruisme* by the French philosopher Auguste Comte 1851, and subsequently introduced into English), have become part of everyday language to a degree which warrants their inclusion in the field – and requires an analysis of where precisely the distinction is between the use of this word as part of an expert terminological taxonomy and as part of the vocabulary of everyday English.

The first distinction is also important because of the frequent lack of clear-cut boundaries between certain entities in the real world (e.g. cups and mugs, night and day, green and blue, shades of emotions such as irritation, annoyance, anger, fury or rage). Within prototype semantics, this has led some scholars to the (hasty) conclusion that there are only fuzzy borders between the meanings of, say, *cup* or *mug*, *night* and *day*, *green* and *blue*, or *irritation*, *anger* or *fury*. But we have to distinguish between the fuzziness of reference, that is, the highly frequent existence of fuzzy borders in reality, and the structure of language, where clear semantic oppositions exist between *cup* and *mug* etc. (cf. Wierzbicka 1985; Kleiber 1993: 107f.). We can seriously disagree about the reference of terms, for example, whether someone is indeed annoyed or angry. However, at the same time we can perfectly agree on the meaning of *annoyed*, *angry* (cf. Coseriu/ Geckeler 1981: 49).

The importance of the first distinction does not preclude a comparison of the historical development of everyday language and the parallel development of scientific terminologies. For instance, it is interesting to note that many of the technical terms quoted above were introduced into English at the end of the 19th century or the beginning of the 20th century. Examples include *libido* (1909), *masochism* (1893), *necrophilia* (1892), *sadism* (1888) (cf. the OED and Hughes 2000: 385). This comparative historical analysis, however, is the second step – to be taken after the first distinction has been determined.

The second distinction excludes meta-linguistic usages of lexical items. In this way, pseudo-problems such as the meaning of *love* within paradoxical inferences of the type *All you need is "love". Therefore, all you need is a word with four letters* can be avoided. Ultimately, meta-linguistic usage "does not include any semantic structuring, for we are here concerned with an unlimited nomenclature in which every element stands in contrast to every other element" (Coseriu/ Geckeler 1981: 50).

The third distinction (synchrony vs diachrony), made famous by Ferdinand de Saussure (1968: 140), is especially important in the present paper. It would make absolutely no sense to deal with the meaning of English emotion terms regardless of the changes that the semantic micro-field of "love, hate and anger" has undergone from 1700 up to the present day. Specific (metaphorical) senses[4] of lexical items have been newly created, other senses of words have disappeared, and even entire words have become obsolete or have been introduced into the language.

For example, *amour*, a French loanword which until the 18th century had been used as a synonym for *love*, was later restricted to the current meaning "a (secret or illicit) love-affair". The semantic shift of the phrase *to make love* towards the sense "to copulate" took place during the 19th century. Hughes (2000: 45) comments that "[u]ntil the early part of this century [= the 20th c.] to *make love* meant roughly the same as 'to flirt'." The lexical item *rese* ("a rush, run") had the metaphorical sense "hot temper, anger" until the beginning of the 15th century, but does not exist in Modern English (cf. OED). Moreover, changes of the meaning of a word have repercussions for the meaning of its 'field-neighbours' and, ultimately, for the whole lexical field (cf. Coseriu 1964; Lehrer 1998).

Coseriu and Geckeler (1981: 51) make clear that this distinction is a purely methodological one: You cannot describe the meaning of words without distinguishing synchrony and diachrony. However, unlike Saussure's (1968: 30) rather static view of the synchronic system of a language, Coseriu favours a perspective where the system is undergoing perpetual movement. In this view, the speakers of a language (re-)create the system dynamically, in an ever ongoing goal-orientated process, though ordinary speakers do not do this consciously and most of time re-create the language in very much the same way. In this way, language is constantly being created through change:

[3] "Words" are here understood as "lexical morphemes" (or "lexemes", "lexical items"), that is, "the units functioning within a lexical field" (cf. Coseriu/ Geckeler 1981: 57).

[4] "Sense" is here understood as one of the several meanings which a word can have. These can be purely contextual meanings or conventionalized meanings of polysemous words.

"La lengua se hace mediante el cambio" (cf. Coseriu 1958: 160). Therefore, in a way, language is being constantly changed. This insight leads to Coseriu's somewhat hyperbolic *bon mot* "Language change does not exist" (cf. Coseriu 1983: 53), which has to be understood with this theoretical background in mind.

The distinction between the "technique of discourse" and "repeated discourse" means that we have to distinguish between units of discourse which can be freely combined according to the syntactic and semantic rules of a language, and morphologically, syntactically and semantically fixed expressions and locutions (idioms, proverbs, quotations). Fixed expressions can correspond to simple words, phrases, clauses/ sentences or texts. If the fixed expressions correspond to simple words, they can function in opposition with simple words within lexical fields. For example, the metaphorical noun phrase *hot temper* has become a synonym for *anger* and has been attested in this sense since 1597, whereas the noun *temper* has been recorded in the OED as synonymous with *anger* only from 1828 onwards.

Having distinguished the technique of discourse from repeated discourse in this way, however, we can proceed to look at repeated discourse also at the clause and sentence level, and in this way try to enrich the semantic description of nouns and verbs such as *love*, *hate* and *anger*. Especially metaphorical expressions or proverbs in which two or more of these words appear can contribute to our understanding of semantic nuances and differences between such words: *Love is akin to hate*; *Love is blind, so is hatred*; *Hate likely turns to love*; *Anger and love give bad counsel* etc. (cf. Mieder 1992: 18, 285, 387ff.).

The distinction between the "architecture of language" ("historical language") and the "structure of language" ("functional language") is very important for the demarcation of lexical fields. We have to distinguish between the 'architectural' diversity within a synchronic stage of a "historical language" such as Modern English or Classical Latin from the structural unity within a "functional language", that is, a homogeneous sub-system of the historical language, for example, Modern Standard English or Classical literary Latin. If we do not make this distinction, we will be overwhelmed by 'pseudo-synonymous' words which differ semantically only insofar as they originate from different varieties or registers of one and the same historical language. These 'pseudo-synonyms' are different as to the geographical space in which they are used ("diatopic" differences, dialects), the socio-cultural classes of their users ("diastratic" differences, sociolects) and the intention of expression ("diaphasic" differences, language styles, e.g. common vs literary language) (cf. Coseriu/ Geckeler 1981: 52).

Here are a few examples illustrating the 'architectural' diversity of the micro-field "love, hate and anger" in Modern English. The noun *self-love* differs from *amour propre* mostly because the latter is a foreign word (a French loan word, attested in the OED from 1775 onwards and said to be "in common use" in contemporary English) and thus belongs to a more formal style (probably a higher register usage). The nouns *crave* and *craving* have approximately the same lexical meaning, but *crave*, unlike *craving*, is no longer part of the common or baseline lexical inventory of Modern English. The verb *to fancy* seems to be more typical for British English than for American English (cf. the labelling "BrE" in the LDOCE). The verbs *to yearn* and *to pine* have a more literary connotation than *to long for*. The noun *odium*, due to its easily recognizable Latin origin, is more formal than *hate* or *loathing*. Finally, the nouns *ire* and *wrath* have a more written and/ or poetic connotation than *anger*.

In general, one can say that English words of French, Latin or Greek origin have a less intensive emotional connotation than their Germanic counterparts:

> The emotive quality of the Germanic roots of the language is also a notable feature of the lexicon. Thus *heart*, *hearth*, *home*, *love*, *lust*, *yearn*, *hate*, *loathe* and *weep* convey a more intense feeling than their Norman French or Latin counterparts. (Hughes 2000: 108f.)

As soon as one functional language has been chosen, words pertaining to other varieties can be excluded from further description. Again, at a later stage of investigation, further registers can be compared with the functional language chosen at the beginning. Within the limits of this paper, I will focus on Modern Standard English. However, English words will be included into the micro-field "love, hate and anger" in a very flexible way, that is, I prefer to risk including too many terms rather than miss some important ones. A further reason is the recent development of "Englishes" all over the world, the shift away from the British standard to the U.S. standard (cf. Webster 1993) and the changing attitudes of speakers towards foreign elements in the lexicon (cf. Hughes 2000: 358ff.; Markus 2004).

The next distinction concerns four different levels of the structure of a language: type, system, norm and discourse. For the description of a lexical field of a particular functional language, the type "as the unity of the various procedures" of the system (Coseriu/ Geckeler 1981: 53) is not of primary importance. The system is the "functional (or distinctive) level of language" (Coseriu/ Geckeler 1981: 54), where functional units such as lexemes are opposed to each other via distinctive semantic features. This is the single most important level for a structural approach to semantics. At this level, the 'semantic neighbours', that is, close synonyms in a field (cf. *liking*, *affection*, *sympathy* or *rage*, *fury*) have to be distinguished from each other (cf. below, section 2, for an attempt to distinguish between some of these synonyms). Furthermore, semantic relations (cf. Lyons 1977 I: 270ff.) have to be described. The most important semantic relations between words are antonymy (that is, words with the same semantic features and one pair of directly opposed features, e.g. *love* vs *hate*, *desire* vs *disgust*, *to like* vs *to dislike*); hyponymy (words entailing the sense of superordinate items, e.g. *love*, *hate*, *anger* vs *emotion*); homonymy (words with the same form but belonging to different lexical fields, e.g. *long* as adjective with the meaning "of great extent" and *long* as verb with the meaning "to feel a strong desire"; or *pine* as noun ("tree") and *pine* as verb "to have a continuing fruitless desire"); polysemy (words which have two or more conventionalized senses, but share a semantic core and belong to the same lexical field, e.g. *passion* as "anger" or "sexual desire") and synonymy (two or more words with different forms and the 'same' meaning, e.g. *fury* and *rage*). In fact, even close synonyms differ slightly in meaning. For example, according to the OED, *rage* unlike *fury* can also have the sense "appetite, violent desire, sexual passion".

The norm is "the level of what is merely traditionally fixed and not necessarily functional" (Coseriu/ Geckeler 1981: 54), that is, common usage, the traditional realization of the oppositions of the system. For example, the system of English word

formation provides the suffix-variants *-ance/ ence* and *-ancy/ ency* for deriving emotion nouns from verbs and adjectives. However, only a part of all derivations with these suffixes is acceptable according to the contemporary norm. Thus the OED lists *abhorrence*, *benelovence* and *repugnance* among the derivations still in use, but no longer *abhorrency*, *benevolency* and *repugnancy*, which disappeared as emotion terms in the course of the 18th century. (Both suffixes are "probably no longer productive" according to Bauer 1983: 222).

At the level of the system, all words belonging to a lexical field have to be equally described as to their specific semantic contribution to the field. At the level of the norm, however, we find a difference between more central, "prototypical" lexical items (which are cognitively more basic according to the central insight of prototype semantics, cf. Rosch 1978) and more peripheral lexical items. The central words of a field tend to be simple and short (cf. *love*, *lust* and *hate*), that is, they are not construed as compounds or derivations (cf. *self-love*, *ill-temper*, *inclination* or *abomination*). Moreover, they are often inherited words (cf. again *love*, *lust* and *hate*) and not loan words (cf. *enmity*, from Old French *enemistié*, or *to desire*, from Old French *desirer*), let alone foreign words (cf. French *amour propre*, Latin *odium*). However, there are exceptions to this tendency, for example, *anger* (a loanword from Old Norse *angr*) or *to annoy* (from Old French *enuier*). Furthermore, idioms, proverbs etc. mostly involve the central items and not the peripheral ones (cf. Mieder 1992, where *love*, *hate* and *anger* figure prominently). Finally, their meaning is relatively broad, that is, they are often highly polysemous and not nearly as specialized in their meaning as peripheral items. Thus, *love* can express all kinds of strong affections, from "altruistic love" or "Platonic love" via "paternal/ maternal love" to "romantic love", "sexual desire" and "egoism" (cf. *self-love*). This clearly differs from semantically much more specialized items such as *lust* ("sexual desire"), *charity* ("altruistic love") or *sympathy* ("a feeling of solidarity and liking"). The central units are often also the more frequent ones. Therefore, the norm is the level where statistical distributions of words in texts become relevant. In this respect, modern corpus analysis proves to be extremely fruitful. Only few of the more than 120 words within the micro-field of "love, hate and anger" are among the most frequent words used in Modern Standard English, as indicated in the entries of the LDOCE (2003). The following 14 words (seven nouns and seven verbs) belong to the 3000 most frequently used words in Modern English:

Nouns:

anger [W3], *care* [S2, W2], *charity* [S2, W3], *enthusiasm* [W3], *favour* [S1, W2] [BrE]/ *favor* [AmE], *love* [S1, W1], *passion* [W3].

Verbs:

annoy [S1], *care* [S1, W3], *fancy* [S3] [BrE], *favour* [W3] [BrE]/ *favor* [AmE], *hate* [S1 W3], *like* [S1, W1], *love* [S1, W1].

Abbreviations: S = spoken; W = written; 1 = among the 1000 most frequent words; 2 = among the 2000 most frequent words; 3 = among the 3000 most frequent words; BrE = British English; AmE = American English.

The frequency of lexical units is also revealing as far as the proportion of nouns and verbs and the proportion of 'positive' emotion terms (*love*, *like*, *affection* etc.) and 'negative' emotion terms (*hate*, *malice*, *aversion* etc.) is concerned. While the proportion of nouns (ca. 80) and verbs (ca. 40) in the micro-field "love, hate and anger" is about 2:1, this discrepancy disappears among the 3000 most frequent words, where the proportion of the nouns and verbs words is 1:1 (seven nouns, seven verbs).

Furthermore, it has been claimed that words with negative connotations are more frequent in the lexicon: "It is perhaps a sad reflection on human nature that the 'negative' word-fields in the thesaurus are so much larger than the 'positive'" (Hughes 2000: 21). And indeed, the positive emotion terms are clearly outnumbered by the negative emotion terms: There are about 50 positive terms and about 70 negative terms (for the similar, though less dramatic asymmetry in Classical Latin and Greek cf. Kienpointner 1996: 614; 1999: 167f.). However, among the most frequent English words, the asymmetry is reversed: There are eleven positive (*care* n, *care* v, *charity*, *enthusiasm*, *fancy*, *favour/ favor* n, *favour/ favor* v, *like*, *love* n, *love* v, *passion*) and only four negative emotion terms (*anger*, *annoy*, *hate*, *passion*).[5]

The fourth level of the functional language is the discourse level. At this level, verbal and situational context becomes the most important factor. The core meaning of words can be restricted, extended or figuratively modified. These contextual meanings are often listed in dictionaries as different senses of a word. Strictly speaking, only the different senses of polysemous words, which share a common semantic core (e.g. "strong emotion" in the case of *passion*, which can have the senses of "anger" and "sexual desire") and not the potentially infinite set of contextual meanings should be described. Therefore, contextual meanings should be excluded from the description of lexical fields. However, a sharp line between the finite senses of polysemous words and the infinite contextual meanings is hard to draw because the latter can become conventionalized to differing degrees (cf. Algeo 1997: 69).

A few highly conventional metaphorical meanings of emotion terms can be summarized as follows: "love is unity", "love is a journey", "love is heat", "love is madness", "love is war" or "hate is blindness", "anger is heat", "anger is madness", "anger is a wild beast". These metaphors have become part of the core meaning. Similarly, "sexual desire" has become part of the core meaning of nouns like *appetite*, *hunger*, *thirst*; nouns like *bile*, *choler*, *gall* have the conventional meaning of "anger, ill temper", and verbs like *to burn*, *to boil*, *to explode* mean "to be (extremely) angry". In this respect, I would like to support the position of Lakoff (1987, 1993), Kövecses (1988, 1990, 2000, 2002), Gibbs (1994) and other cognitive linguists and psychologists who have amply shown that conventional metaphorical meanings are omnipresent, cognitively basic and need not be contextually derived.

However, I would equally like to support Wierzbicka's (1999) claim that emotion terms (and, indeed, all lexical items) can be defined without using metaphorical expressions. The very fact that we can distinguish metaphorical and non-metaphorical uses of words, even if the metaphorical uses are highly conventionalized, justifies the dichotomy of "literal" and "metaphorical" meaning in principle. We know that "love" is not identical with "heat" or "madness", even if we frequently use these metaphorical

[5] Here I count *passion* twice, as it is a polysemous noun and can mean both "sexual desire" and "anger".

mappings. Thus, literal meaning could be called the 'core of the core meaning'. Still, this is not denying that it may be very difficult to distinguish literal and figurative meanings in specific cases (cf. Kövecses 1990: 15; Gibbs 1994: 24ff.; Kienpointner 2004).

Structural semantics has also been criticized because it is extremely difficult to define a concept with a set of necessary and sufficient properties. This reproach, however, neglects the difference between scientific and philosophical definitions (going back ultimately to the Aristotelian model of definition) which deal with the reference of expressions in relation to real world objects, and linguistic definitions which deal with language-specific meanings (cf. Wierzbicka 1985: 212ff.; Kleiber 1993: 13f.). A definition of the core meaning of a word is not falsified by pointing out that the word can be used to refer to many different objects (cf. Wittgenstein's (1975: 56ff.) famous example *Spiel:* "game"). Rather, we can justify a definition of the core meaning by being able to derive all contextual meanings from the supposed core meaning.

However, Kövecses (1990: 15ff.) is right in criticizing the fact "that the core alone cannot capture the totality of our experiences in connection with given aspects of the world (like the emotions, for example)." After having defined the core meaning, therefore, we have to take into account additional aspects of meaning for a more comprehensive semantic description (cf. Kleiber 1993: 99 and below, section 3).

As far as the problem of the inclusion of words into lexical fields is concerned, I will not include words used metaphorically such as *hunger*, *thirst*, *bile*, *to burn, to boil* etc. into the field, because the literal meanings of *hunger*, *thirst*, *to burn* etc. do not signify an emotion. Words such as *love*, *anger*, *hate* etc., however, are more intimately connected with emotions, because both their literal sense and the metaphorical senses ("love is heat" etc.) deal with emotions.

The final methodological distinction concerns the difference between "signification" ("meaning" in the narrow, language-specific sense) and "designation" (more often called "reference"). Lexical field theory is concerned with meaning rather than with reference (Coseriu/ Geckeler 1981: 54).

I wish to finish this section with some remarks on semantic meta-language. Several formats have been suggested. In structural semantics, the meaning of a word has been described as a set of "semantic markers" (also called *sèmes*; cf. Greimas 1966, Katz 1972, Pottier 1992). This kind of meta-language, "markerese", has been criticized for the following reasons:

1. The universality of markerese has never been convincingly demonstrated (in spite of the efforts of Katz 1972: 244f.). The markers employed in early approaches are often simply adjectives, nouns and verbs of a specific language put between parentheses.
2. The possibility of interpreting the sets of markers as a plausible characterization of the core meaning can be questioned. For example, there are no explicit hints concerning the fact that "human" as a semantic feature of *man* or *woman* has to be properly understood as "belonging to the species homo sapiens" and not as "being humane".
3. In order to be understood properly, the markers themselves would have to be defined. But this ultimately leads to an infinite regress of semantic meta-languages. This, however, makes it doubtful whether a finite set of meta-linguistic expressions could ultimately be established.

Therefore, some linguists have given up the postulates of the universality, non-circularity and finiteness of markerese and simply consider the semantic features as expressions of a particular language which are used meta-linguistically. That is, they are convenient abbreviations given in place of more comprehensive descriptions of the meaning (cf. Coseriu 1973: 14f.; Lyons 1977 I, 334f.). More specifically, Pottier (1992: 73) characterizes the "sème" as "un discours périphrastique à vocation méta-linguistique" ("a periphrastic meta-linguistic discourse").

However, as convenient as this practice is (and I will make ample use of it below), using expressions of a particular natural language A as a semantic meta-language increases the danger of a perspective which is biased as to the semantic structures of A. Therefore, Wierzbicka has tried to construct a truly universal metalanguage ("Natural Semantic Metalanguage" = NSM). Wierzbicka (1999: 36f.) restricts the number of meta-linguistic expressions to about 60 elements, among which she includes, for example, "I, you, person, thing, people, one, two, some, many, good, bad, big, small, do, make, feel, believe, have, not, because, if, now, here." She explicitly excludes all more specific lexical items which would make the semantic description blatantly circular or biased towards one particular language. Moreover, and most interestingly, Wierzbicka formulates her semantic descriptions as full sentences which together form a coherent text. This makes it possible to describe emotion terms of a language as a prototypical scenario. As far as this format of meta-linguistic description is concerned, Wierzbicka's version of the core meaning view does not seem to be incompatible with the prototypical scenarios of cognitive approaches. These scenarios are assumed to be 'the point of convergence' of the most important metaphors and metonymies dealing with emotions, for example, in the (shortened) scenario for "ideal love" formulated by Kövecses:

1. True love comes along.
   The other attracts me irresistibly.
   The attraction reaches the limit point on the intensity scale at once.
2. The intensity of the attraction goes beyond the limit point.
3. I am in a state of lack of control.
   Love's intensity is maximal.
   I feel that my love gives me extra energy.
   I view myself and the other as forming a unity.
   I experience the relationship as a state of perfect harmony.
   I see love as something that guarantees the stability of the relationship.
   I believe that love is a need, that this love is my true love, that the object of love is irreplaceable, and that love lasts forever.
   Love is mutual. [...]
   I experience love as something pleasant. [...]
   I am happy. (Kövecses 1988: 58f.)

The advantage of these formats of meta-linguistic descriptions is that they are short texts rather than traditional 'one-sentence-definitions' or sets of markers. In this way, they are more adequate than earlier formats, both theoretically and practically.

Theoretically, they provide a more consistent and more comprehensive view of the described emotions than many traditional definitions in dictionaries. Practically, the text-format comes closer to everyday communicative practices of explaining and describing the meaning of words. At the same time, they are easier to understand than definitions in dictionaries or "markerese" because they are self-explanatory, at least to a certain degree (Wierzbicka's descriptions are somewhat difficult to understand because of the rigorous restrictions imposed on NSM).

However, as far as lexicographical practice is concerned, obvious problems of space remain, which prevent the implementation of longer text-formats. But there are compromises leading to practical solutions, some of which have already been realized. Lexicographers have managed to reduce the size of their defining vocabulary, using only 2000 words, for example, in the LDOCE (2003: xi). These are many more than the 60 items of NSM, but the problem of cumbersome formulations in NSM is avoided and an important step towards overcoming the circularity problem has been made. Moreover, some lexicographers have developed a more communicative style in their definitions, addressing the reader directly:

1. If you love someone,

1.1. you have very strong feelings or affection towards them and feel romantically or sexually attracted to them, and they are very important to you. [...]

1.2. you feel that their happiness is very important to you, and usually show this feeling in the way you behave towards them. [...] (COBUILD (1987: 865)

To sum up, important steps towards the development of theoretically adequate and practically feasible semantic definitions have been made, although much remains to be done to achieve the ideal of adequate and at the same time short and easy-to-understand semantic descriptions.

2. The recent history of the English micro-field "love, hate and anger"

Using the theoretical distinctions introduced above, I would now like to list the words of the micro-field of "love, hate and anger" in contemporary Standard English and in Standard English ca. 300 years ago (1700 AD). The field contains more than 120 words and is divided into the sections "love" and "anger, hate", respectively. I have listed not only simple nouns and verbs, but also compounds and derivations. As abstract nouns can always be derived from an adjective with the suffix *-ness*, I have decided to include emotion terms ending in *-ness* only if there is no closely synonymous noun. Hence, *affectionateness* (cf. *affection*), *benevolentness* (cf. *benevolence*) and *wrathfulness* (cf. *wrath*) are excluded, whereas *selfishness* and *peevishness* are included.

Microfield "love, hate, anger" 2000: 124 words

I. Section "love":

35 nouns:

affection, altruism, amorousness, amour propre, ardour, benevolence, care, charity, crave, craving, desire, eagerness, egoism, egotism, enthusiasm, fancy, favour, fondness, goodwill, hanker, inclination, lasciviousness, lewdness, like, liking, longing, love, lust, passion, selfishness, self-love, sympathy, wantonness, yearn, yearning.

16 verbs:

affection, care, cherish, crave, desire, fancy, favour, hanker, incline, like, long, love, lust, pine, sympathize, yearn.

II. Section "hate, anger":

51 nouns:

abhorrence, abomination, anger, animosity, annoy, annoyance, antipathy, aversion, despite, detestation, disaffection, dislike, enmity, exasperation, fury, grudge, hate, hatred, hostility, ill-will, indignation, irascibility, ire, irritation, loathing, malice, malignancy, malignance, malignity, malevolence, moroseness, odium, odiousness, passion, peevishness, rabies, rage, rancour, repellency, repellence, repugnance, resentment, scorn, self-hate, self-hatred, spite, temper, hot temper, ill-temper, vexation, wrath.

22 verbs:

abhor, abominate, anger, annoy, despise, despite, detest, disaffect, dislike, enrage, exasperate, grudge, hate, irritate, loathe, provoke, rage, repel, resent, scorn, spite, vex.

Fig. 1: "Love, hate, anger" - 2000

Micro-field "love, hate, anger" 1700: 130 words

I. Section "love":

39 Nouns:

affection, altruism, amorousness, amour, ardour, benevolence, benevolency, care, charity, crave, craving, desire, eagerness, egoism, enthusiasm, fancy, favour, fondness, goodwill, hanker, inclination, lasciviousness, lewdness, like, liking, longing, love, lust, passion, selfishness, self-love, sympathy, wantonness, yearn, yearning, zeal.

17 Verbs:

affection, care, cherish, crave, desire, fancy, favour, hanker, incline, like, long, love, lust, pine, sympathize, yearn.

II. Section "hate, anger":

56 nouns:

abhorrence, abhorrency, abomination, anger, animosity, annoy, annoyance, antipathy, aversion, despite, detestation, disaffection, dislike, enmity, exasperation, fury, grudge, hate, hatred, hostility, ill-will, indignation, ire, irritation, loathing, malice, malignancy, malignance, malignity, malevolence, moroseness, odium, odiousness, passion, peevishness, rabies, rage, rancour, repellency, repellence, repugnance, repugnancy, resent, resentment, scorn, self-hate, self-hatred, spite, temper, hot temper, ill-temper, vexation, wrath, wroth.

25 verbs:

abhor, abominate, anger, annoy, despise, despite, detest, disaffect, dislike, enrage, exasperate, fury, grudge, hate, ire, irritate, loathe, malice, provoke, rage, repel, resent, scorn, spite, vex.

Fig. 2: "Love, hate, anger" - 1700

The archilexemes[6] of the micro-field are *love* on the one hand and *anger* and *hate* on the other. The core meaning of the noun *love* could be given as "a strong affection which you feel for somebody or something; if the object of your love is a person, you want to be close to him or her, care for his or her well-being and want to be approved by him or her." The word *love*, both as a noun and as a verb is so general in its meaning that most, if not all lexemes semantically imply it (e.g. *affection* = "tender love"; cf. Davitz 1969: 33f., 70f. on *affection* and *love*); *ardour* = "passionate love"; *charity/ devotion* = "altruistic/ dedicated love"; *lust, wantonness, lewdness, lasciviousness* = "sensual love"; *to like/ to sympathize* = "to love as a friend/ as a fellow being"; *to cherish* = "to take care of somebody out of love").

Anger and *hate* are far more specific in their meaning (especially the verb *to anger*) and are implied by differing groups of words in the field.[7] The meaning of the noun *anger* involves a strong feeling of displeasure at treatment which is perceived to be extremely unfair or painful, combined with an urgent desire for revenge or compensation. This is encapsulated in Aristotle's definition of *orgé* (Ancient Greek: "anger") as a "desire for retaliation" (cf. Aristotle, De anima, 403a 30-31; Rhetoric, 1382a 1ff.). In this way, *anger* is semantically implied by *annoyance/ irritation* = "relatively slight degree of anger", *fury/ rage* = "crazed anger", *indignation/ resentment* = "anger aroused by something unjust or mean"; *irascibility* = "disposition to get angry easily and quickly", *grudge* = "deep-seated anger", *to annoy/ exasperate/ vex* = "to make angry"; *to enrage* = "to make furiously angry", *to scorn* = "to reject in angry contempt".

[6] Archilexemes are words whose meaning covers the whole lexical (macro- or micro-)field or a section of it, that is, the lexemes within the field/ section are hyponyms of the archilexeme.

[7] Cf. the interesting similarities and differences of the descriptions for *anger* and *hate* given by informants in Davitz 1969: 35f., 64f.

The meaning of *hate* does not necessarily involve unjust treatment. In a way, hate is a much more destructive emotion than anger: Aristotle plausibly remarks that anger can be healed by time, but hate is incurable (cf. Aristotle, Rhetoric, 1382a 7-8). What is focussed in the meaning of *hate* is "an intense dislike of somebody or something, often combined with hostility, contempt or disgust". Therefore, this emotion term foregrounds the relationship with another person. Hence the meaning of *hate* in some form is implied by *antipathy/ aversion/ disaffection* = "a feeling of dislike, a slight degree of hate", *rancour* = "intense hate"; *enmity/ hostility* = "hateful dislike, ill-will", *malice/ malignancy* = "hateful feeling, accompanied by the intention of doing unjustified harm"; *odium/ odiousness* = "the condition of being hated", *to spite* = "to annoy with a hateful attitude".

As these examples have already made clear, the micro-field has a central core, grouped around the most prototypical items *love*, *hate* and *anger*, and a periphery, where lexemes share semantic features with emotion terms from semantically related micro-fields (e.g. *disgust*, *contempt*, *sadness*, *respect*, *zeal*). In this way, a number of borderline cases arise, where lexemes can only be assigned with difficulty to one of these micro-fields. Again, my strategy here has been one of liberal inclusion rather than exclusion. More detailed case studies would be necessary to clarify whether nouns like *eagerness* or *keenness* ("zeal combined with liking") or *awe* ("liking combined with respect") or verbs like *to despise* ("to dislike contemptuously") or the verbs *to abhor/ detest/ loathe* ("to hate with disgust") or *to repel* ("to cause aversion combined with disgust") or the nouns *abomination/ detestation* ("hate combined with disgust") or the nouns *morosity/ peevishness* ("deep-seated melancholic ill-temper") should indeed be included in the micro-field "love, hate and anger".

Looking at the differences between the field's structure at the beginning of the 18th century and our times, we can observe that the lexical core of the field has not changed much. Eight words still attested around 1700 have disappeared in the course of the last three centuries. The following dates of the last attested instances are given according to the OED:[8] *amour* ("love": 1742), *abhorrency* ("loathing": 1707), *benevolency* ("favourable feeling": 1766), *to malice* ("to treat maliciously": 1694), *repugnancy* ("dislike": 1702), *resent* ("resentment": 1686), *wroth* ("deep anger": 1663), *zeal* ("ardent love": 1685; "ardent desire": 1697). Although these words have become obsolete as emotion terms within the micro-field "love, hate and anger", some of them still exist as words with other meanings. Among the most important factors leading to the loss of these words are the existence of close synonyms (cf. *abhorrence*, *benevolence*, *repugnance*; cf. Marchand 1969: 250; Nevalainen 1999: 396ff. on the subtle semantic differences), a rather specialized meaning (that is, a small 'functional load'), or their status as a foreign word (*amour*) (cf. Görlach 2002: 96ff.). Two words have been created (borrowed) after 1700: *amour propre* ("self-love": 1775ff.), *egotism* (originally "too frequent reference to oneself": 1714ff.; then "an exaggerated sense of self-importance": 1800ff.).

[8] For the purposes of this paper I always rely on the data given in the OED. But of course, not all of them are beyond doubt (cf. the critical remarks by Algeo 1997: 63f.; Nevalainen 1999: 337f.). In fact, case studies would surely correct some of this data or make it more precise (for an example, cf. Hughes 2000: 275, n. 9).

Many new senses of polysemous words have been created, whereas old senses have vanished. In general, the following tendency can be observed: Older words develop more senses and become more polysemous, younger words tend to be monosemous (Nevalainen 1999: 434). The extra-linguistic conditions which enhance the specialization, generalization, amelioration or pejoration of meanings are social, political and technological changes. The linguistic means for creating new meanings and senses are word formation and the associative use of semantic relations and metaphorical, metonymical and other figurative mappings (cf. Markus 1990: 244ff.; Nevalainen 433ff.; Blank 2001: 74ff., Görlach 2002: 108ff.).

Here are some examples (all data according to the OED): Words frequently develop a more restricted (hyponymic) meaning. The noun *affection*, which was also used as a more general expression with the meaning "passion, lust as opposed to reason", in the course of the 18th century began to specialize this part of its meaning towards the nowadays dominant sense "good will, kind feeling, love". While its 'field-neighbours' (co-hyponyms) *passion* and *temper* can still be used for the 'anti-rational' aspects of emotion, *temper*, in turn, developed the specific sense of "anger" during the 19th century. The opposite development towards a more general meaning can also be observed. The verb *to anger* ("to make angry") in the 18th century still had the more specific sense "to irritate or inflame a sore" (cf. Sterne 1959 (1760): 66: *[...] the parameter [...] angered his* [= Uncle Toby's] *wound*), which disappeared later.

Another diachronic mechanism reflects the process that words gradually lose emphatic meanings and are used in a semantically weakened sense. This seems to have been the origin of the phrases *to love to do something* and *to hate to do something* in the weaker sense of "to like/ dislike to do something".

Metaphorical and metonymical processes are among the major sources of semantic change (cf. Algeo 1997: 69f.; Blank 2001: 74ff.; Kövecses 2002: 216ff.). Quite often, tabooisation and euphemism further the development of metaphorical senses. For example, in the course of the 19th century the phrase *to make love* shifted towards the sense "to copulate", in this way helping to close a gap which existed between the absence of a term for sexual intercourse in common language and the presence of terms in scientific language (*to copulate*) and in slang (e.g. *to fuck, to screw, to ball, to bonk*; cf. Roget 1992: 48; Hughes 2000: 50).

New compounds and metaphors involving emotion terms also reflect historical developments within politics, science and technology (cf. Algeo 1997: 88f.). For example, new metaphors for *anger* were created after the invention of highly effective explosive materials and the introduction of electricity in the 19th century. Thus the metaphorical phrases *to blow one's top, to blow up, to blow a fuse* in the sense of "to lose control of oneself through anger" were created during the second half of the 19th and the first half of the 20th century. As far as social and political changes are concerned, the OED dates the first instance of the compound *sympathy-strike* in 1937 (cf. a more recent example in 1973: *Morning Star* 28, Aug. 3 (heading): *Chrysler hit by sympathy strikers*). New developments in the treatment of alcoholism are reflected in the compound *aversion therapy* (attested 1950ff.).

Interestingly enough, of all the expressions designating organs which were metaphorically or metonymically associated with love, hate or other passionate feelings, the nouns *bile, gall, choler* and *spleen* are still associated with "anger, hate, rancour", albeit only in formal and literary language. The noun *liver* was used to refer to "the seat of love and violent passions in general", but in this use has become archaic. The noun *stomach* stood for various feelings and from the 17th century onwards was also used especially for "anger, irritation, malice", but this sense disappeared in the 19th century (last recorded instance in the OED: 1825).

3. Beyond classical lexical field analysis

In this section, I would like to add a few remarks concerning extensions of standard lexical field analysis. The first extension concerns the treatment of more than one word class. Standard lexical field analysis usually deals with only one word class at a time, which is well-motivated because it makes the semantic description more feasible. However, a comparison between nouns, verbs and adjectives structuring the same semantic zone (e.g. "love") can be theoretically interesting and empirically revealing. Although I have left out adjectives for practical reasons, at least two word classes have been treated: nouns and verbs. A comparison first of all shows that nouns dominate the micro-field numerically 2:1. This asymmetry vanishes, however, as soon as only the 14 most frequent nouns and verbs are taken into account (cf. above, section 2). Furthermore, the massive loss of inflectional endings after the Middle English period has created a great number of formally identical nouns and verbs, which has made conversion one of the most productive procedures of English word formation (cf. Hughes 2000: 341; Görlach 2002: 71). There is a high proportion of convertible nouns and verbs in the field, for example, *affection* n/ v, *anger* n/ v, *annoy* n/ v, *care* n/ v, *desire* n/ v, *dislike* n/ v, *fancy* n/ v, *favour* n/ v, *hate* n/ v, *like* n/ v, *love* n/ v, *lust* n/ v, *rage* n/ v, *scorn* n/ v, *yearn* n/ v. However, as we look at the relative frequency of nouns and verbs, the apparent symmetry often disappears. For example, the noun *anger*, but not the verb *to anger* belongs to the 3000 most frequent words in written contemporary English. The verb *to hate* belongs to the 1000 most frequently spoken and to the 3000 most frequently written words, but the noun *hate* does not even appear among the 3000 most frequent words etc. Furthermore, *love* and *hate* are deverbal nouns, whereas *anger* is a desubstantival verb (Marchand 1969: 369, 374). Finally, some lexical units nowadays appear only as nouns or verbs: *ire, rancour* (nouns); *to pine, to enrage* (verbs). The mere listing of these discrepancies does not explain them. But it is the comparison of word classes which directs our attention to these interesting aspects of lexical fields (cf. Geckeler 1993: 31).

The second extension concerns the usage of the lexemes of a field within sentences and texts. The concept of "lexical solidarity", that is, semantic valency was already introduced by Coseriu (1967) as the syntagmatic counterpart of paradigmatic lexical structures. In this context, it is interesting to note that *to love* and *to hate* are transitive verbs, whereas *to anger* as an ornative, desubstantival verb (cf. Marchand 1969: 369) does not mean "to be angry" but "to make angry". That means, *to be angry*, an intransitive construction with copula and adjective, is the basic expression for the emotion "anger" by means of a verb. Thus, the emotions "love" and "hate" are syntagmatically realized in a more directly 'goal-orientated' way (*X loves/ hates Y*) than the emotion "anger" (*X is angry (at Y)*). Furthermore, the description of the use of

prepositions with emotion terms is not only interesting as a complementary study of syntagmatic aspects of lexical items, but also additionally valuable for their paradigmatic description. For example, the semantics of prepositions like *of, for, at* and *against* partially mirrors the semantics of the nouns *love, hate* and *anger*. As text searches in the OED show, within 853 instances of the noun phrase *love of X*, this construction can have a 'subjective' and an 'objective' sense, that is, "X is loved" or "X loves". The same is true for the 21 instances of *hate of X*. However, in the 32 instances of *anger of X* in the OED, almost consistently the preposition *of* is used in a 'subjective' sense, that is, "X is angry". This further supports the description of the (in)transitivity of the verbs *to love/ to hate/ to anger/ to be angry* given above. Nevertheless, examples such as *Andrea still feels a lot of anger towards her mom* (recorded in the LDOCE corpus) show that *anger*, too, can be constructed in an 'object-orientated' way.

Furthermore, 290 instances of the noun phrase *love for X* entail the proposition "X is loved", whereas there is no such evidence in the OED for *hate/ anger for X* in the sense of "X is hated" or "X is the object of anger". This seemingly neat picture is complicated by the fact that *hate, anger* and *hatred* are not only constructed with the prepositions *at/ against/ towards*, but also appear in noun phrases such as *hate/ anger/ hatred for X* with the sense "X is hated" (cf. the LDOCE example sentence: *In her autobiography, she describes her hatred for her stepfather*).

At the discourse level, proximity searches can show that emotion terms tend to co-occur with certain other words (cf. Greimas' (1966: 69ff.) concept of "isotopie", that is, "coherence", the recurrence of semantic features throughout the text). In this respect, the contextual distribution of the metaphorical adjectives *sweet* and *bitter* or *hot* and *cold* (*icy*), which co-occur with *love, hate* and *anger*, respectively, is especially interesting (cf. Nevalainen 1999: 445f. on synaesthesia). Again, this can be illustrated with data from the OED. In 61 instances of *sweet* occurring at a maximal distance of 10 words before or after *love* (as a noun or verb), either the sense "The loved entity is sweet" or the sense "Love is sweet" is expressed. Furthermore, proverbs are 'condensed' mini-texts ("repeated discourse" according to Coseriu/ Geckeler 1981, cf. above, section 1), where many conventional emotional metaphors occur (cf. Mieder 1992: 38ff., 285, 18f.): *Love is friendship set afire, Love is blind, The road to love is bumpy, The path of love nether runs smooth; Hate is burning fire that may consume the one who hates*; *Anger is short madness, Kill your anger while it's hot* etc.

Finally, I would like to add a few remarks about how authors of literary texts make strategic use of the inventory offered by lexical fields. In the 18th century, the prevailing rationalist climate of the "Augustan Age" (cf. Hughes 2000: 231ff.) was countered by Laurence Sterne (1713-1768) in his 'anti-novel' *Tristram Shandy* not only by the systematic deconstruction of standard narrative procedures, but also by the satirical exposition of the irrational nature of human beings. To do this, in the 8th and 9th books Sterne fully exploits the vocabulary of the conventional metaphor of "love is war" (cf. Kövecses 1988: 72). More than this, he develops it further considerably, using a wealth of military terminology (*siege, campaign, armistice, attack, approach, manoeuvre, skirmishing, general, armour, blind, mantelet, cannon, to be accoutred, to attack, to charge, to advance to, to blow up* etc.; cf. Sterne 1959 [1760-1767]: 395ff.) for an ironic description of the emotional strategies of Uncle Toby and Widow Wadman. The irony is doubled by the parallel description of Uncle Toby's "hobby-horse" of studying fortifications.

Another strategic use of lexical items at the discourse level can be illustrated in the short story *The Black Cat* by Edgar Allan Poe (1809-1849). The basic issue of this text is the gradual self-destruction of a man through his alcohol-driven hate and rage. Not only do most of the terms of the 'negative' section of the micro-field "love, hate and anger" appear in this story, it also shows us how authors make use of the available synonyms for narrative strategies. Poe arranges them in a way which illustrates the gradual increase of anger in the protagonist, from slight irritation to fury and rage, thus creating suspense within the reader, who (correctly) anticipates that something horrible will soon happen:

> For my own part, I soon found a *dislike* to it [= the cat] arising within me. This was just the reverse of what I had anticipated; but – I know not how or why it was – its evident fondness for myself rather *disgusted* and *annoyed* me. By slow degrees, these feelings of *disgust* and *annoyance* rose into the *bitterness of hatred* [...] gradually – very gradually – I came to look upon it with unutterable *loathing* [...]. (Poe 1968 (1845): 31; my emphasis)

In the 20th century, after the findings of Nietzsche and Freud and the atrocities of World War I and II, it became more difficult to be certain about the nature of one's own feelings. The ambivalent nature of emotions such as love and hate is reflected in the newly-coined term *love-hate (relationship)*, which encapsulates insights from the psychoanalytic tradition – albeit at a trivialised level. This paradoxical expression is especially salient because it has been lexicalised. Similar expressions are very common at the discourse level as excellent strategies for the description of contradictory emotions, as the following allegorical passage containing the compound *hate-love* illustrates: "This monstrous hate-love, caressing the bruises itself has made, and shooting forth a forked viper-tongue from between the lips that kiss" (from: John Cowper Powys (1872-1963): *Visions and Revisions* (1915) 244; quoted from the OED).

In 20th-century English literature, emotions such as love are often portrayed as being uncertain, ambivalent and constantly changing (or even impossible: cf. Hughes 2000: 328f.). The protagonists hesitate as to the true nature of their feelings and this laborious process of feeling, thinking and reflecting is portrayed by authors such as James Joyce and Virginia Woolf via the "stream of consciousness"-technique. In addition, the rapid and inconsistent change of emotional states is described with a wealth of incompatible emotion terms, implicit allusions to emotions and creative metaphors of emotions (cf. Adamson 1997: 677; Kövecses 2002: 45f.). In the following passage from the novel *Mrs. Dalloway* by Virginia Woolf (1882-1941), Clarissa Dalloway, in a slightly confused way, reflects upon her feelings (jealousy? nostalgic love? pity? anger?) for Peter Walsh. Peter is a friend from her youth, who after many years in India has come back to England and just told her he is in love with a married woman:

> She flattered him; she fooled him, thought Clarissa; shaping the woman, the wife of the Major in the Indian Army, with three strokes of a knife. What a waste! What a folly! All his life long Peter had been fooled like that [...] – *thank*

Heaven she had refused to marry him! Still, *he was in love*; her old *friend*, her *dear* Peter, *was in love*.

[...] he actually pared his nails with his pocket-knife.

For Heaven's sake, leave your knife alone! She cried to herself in *irrepressible irritation*; it was his *silly* unconventionality, his weakness; his lack of the ghost of a notion what any one else was feeling that *annoyed* her, had *always annoyed* her; and now at his age, how *silly*!

[...] then to his utter surprise, [...] he burst into tears; wept; wept without the least shame, sitting on the sofa, the tears running down his cheeks.

And Clarissa had leant forward, taken his hand, drawn him to her, kissed him, – actually had felt his face on hers before she could down *the brandishing of silver-flashing plumes like pampas grass in a tropic gale in her breast*, which, subsiding, left her holding his hand, patting his knee, and *feeling* as she sat back *extraordinarily at her ease with him* and *light-hearted*, all in a clap it came over her, *If I had married him, this gaiety would have been mine all day*! (Woolf 1996 [1925]: 51f.; my emphasis)

4. Conclusions

Using the methodology established by Coseriu/ Geckeler (1981) as a theoretical basis and historical data from Modern Standard English (1700-2000) as material for illustration, the present contribution has addressed the major theoretical problems of lexical field analysis, in particular the distinction between (1) extralinguistic reality and language and (2) system, norm and discourse. With the help of these distinctions, we can come closer to the solution of a number of problems, for example, the demarcation of lexical fields and the distinction between core, peripheral and metaphorical meanings. Recent developments in semantic theory such as Wierzbicka's Natural Semantic Meta-Language and Lakoff/ Kövecses' cognitive approach to metaphor have contributed to the development of a more refined semantic meta-language and a more comprehensive treatment of the semantics of emotion terms.

References

Adamson, Sylvia. 1997. "Literary Language." In Romaine, Suzanne, ed. *The Cambridge History of the English Language. Vol. IV. 1776-1997.* Cambridge: Cambridge UP. 589-692.

Algeo, John. 1997. "Vocabulary." In Romaine, Suzanne, ed. *The Cambridge History of the English Language. Vol. IV. 1776-1997.* Cambridge: Cambridge UP: 57-91.

Bauer, Laurie. 1983. *English Word-formation*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP.

Blank, Andreas. 2001. *Einführung in die lexikalische Semantik*. Tübingen: Niemeyer.

Collins COBUILD English Dictionary. 1987. London: Harper Collins.

Coseriu, Eugenio. 1958. *Sincronia, diacronia e historia*. Montevideo: Universidad de la Republica.

Coseriu, Eugenio. 1964. "Pour une sémantique diachronique structurale." *Travaux de linguistique et littérature* II (1): 139-186.

Coseriu, Eugenio. 1967. "Lexikalische Solidaritäten." *Poetica* 1.3: 293-303.

Coseriu, Eugenio. 1973. *Probleme der strukturellen Semantik*. Tübingen: Narr.

Coseriu, Eugenio. 1983. "Language Change Does not Exist." *Linguistica Nuova ed Antica. Rivista di linguistica classica medioevale e moderna* 1: 51-63.

Coseriu, Eugenio.1988. *Einführung in die Allgemeine Sprachwissenschaft*. Tübingen: Francke.

Coseriu, Eugenio, and Horst Geckeler. 1981. *Trends in Structural Semantics*. Tübingen: Narr.

Davitz, Joel R. 1969. *The Language of Emotion*. New York: Academic Press.

Geckeler, Horst. 1971. *Strukturelle Semantik und Wortfeldtheorie*. München: Fink.

Geckeler, Horst. 1993. "Strukturelle Wortfeldforschung heute." In Lutzeier, P.R., ed. *Studien zur Wortfeldtheorie*. Tübingen: Niemeyer. 11-21.

Gibbs, Raymond. 1994. *The Poetics of Mind*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP.

Goddard, Cliff. 2004. "The Ethnopragmatics and Semantics of 'Active Metaphors'." *Journal of Pragmatics* 36: 1211-1230.

Görlach, Manfred. 2002. *Einführung in die englische Sprachgeschichte*. Heidelberg: Winter.

Greimas, Algirdas. 1966. *Sémantique structurale*. Paris: Larousse.

Hughes, Geoffrey. 2000. *A History of English Words*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Katz, Jerrold J. 1972. *Semantic Theory*. New York: Harper and Row.

Kienpointner, Manfred. 1996. "Structural Semantics and Latin Linguistics." In Rosén, H., ed. *Aspects of Latin*. Innsbruck: Verlag des Inst. f. Sprachwissenschaft. 603-617.

Kienpointner, Manfred. 1998. "De ira cum studio. Sur la colère en latin, allemand et d'autres langues. In García Hernandez, B., ed. *Estudios de lingüística latina*." Madrid: Ediciones Clásicas. 915-927.

Kienpointner, Manfred. 1999. "Zum Wortfeld 'Liebe-Haß' im Altgriechischen." In Anreiter, P., and E. Jerem, eds. *Studia Celtica et Indogermanica*. Budapest: Archäolingua. 163-177.

Kienpointner, Manfred. 2004. "Metaphern für Emotionen: Universalien oder Kulturspezifik?" In Zybatow, L., ed. *Translation in der globalen Welt und neue Wege in der Sprach- und Übersetzerausbildung*. Frankfurt a. M.: Lang. 61-91.

Kleiber, George. 1998. *Prototypensemantik. Eine Einführung*. Tübingen.

Kövecses, Zoltan. 1988. *The Language of Love: The Semantics of Passion in Conversational English*. Lewisburg: Bucknell UP.

Kövecses, Zoltan. 1990. *Emotion Concepts*. New York: Springer.

Kövecses, Zoltan. 2000. *Metaphor and Emotion; Language, Culture, and Body in Human Feeling*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP.

Kövecses, Zoltan. 2002. *Metaphor. A Practical Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford UP.

Lakoff, George. 1987. *Women, Fire and Dangerous Things*. Chicago: Chicago UP.

Lakoff, George. 1993. "The Contemporary Theory of Metaphor." In Ortony, A., ed. *Metapher and Thought*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP. 202-251.

Lakoff, George, and Mark Johnson. 1980. *Metaphors We Live by*. Chicago: Chicago UP.

Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English. 2003. *New Edition + CD-ROM*. Harlow: Pearson.

Lehrer, Adrienne. 1998. "Scapes, Holics, and Thons: The Semantics of English Combining Forms." *American Speech* 73.1: 3-28.

Lyons, John. 1997. *Semantics*. 2 Vols. Cambridge: Cambridge UP.

The Oxford English Dictionary. 1992. *Second Edition. On Compact Disk*. Oxford: Oxford UP.

Marchand, Hans. 1969. *The Categories and Types of Present-Day English Word-Formation*. München: Beck.

Markus, Manfred. 1990. *Mittelenglisches Studienbuch*. Tübingen: Francke.

Markus, Manfred. 2004. "Die englische Herausforderung: Sprachlicher Standard und Varietäten in der internationalen Kommunikation." In Zybatow, L., ed. *Translation in der globalen Welt und neue Wege in der Sprach- und Übersetzerausbildung*. Frankfurt a. M.: Lang. 117-132.

Mieder, Wolfgang. 1992. *A Dictionary of American Proverbs*. New York: Oxford UP.

Nevalainen, Terttu. 1999. "Early Modern English Lexis and Semantics." In Lass, Roger, ed. *The Cambridge History of the English Language. Vol. III. 1476-1776*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP. 332-458.

Poe, Edgar Allan. 1968. "The Black Cat." *American Short Stories*. Ed. D. Grant. London: Oxford UP.

Pottier, Bernard. 1992. *Théorie et analyse en linguistique*. Paris: Hachette.

Roget's International Thesaurus. 1992 [1852]. 5th ed. Ed. Robert L. Chapman. New York: HarperCollins.

Rosch, Eleanor. 1978. "Principles of Categorization." In Rosch, Eleanor, and B.B. Lloyd, eds. *Cognitions and Categorization*. Hillsdale: Erlbaum. 27-48.

Saussure, Ferdinand de. 1968. *Cours de linguistique générale*. Ed. R. Engler. Tome 1. Wiesbaden: Harassowitz.

Sterne, Laurence. 1959. *Tristram Shandy*. London: Dent & Sons.

Webster's New Encyclopedic Dictionary. 1993. New York: Black Dog & Leventhal.

Wierzbicka, Anna. 1985. *Lexicography and Conceptual Analysis*. Ann Arbor: Karoma.

Wierzbicka, Anna. 1999. *Emotions across Languages and Cultures: Diversity and Universals*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP.

Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1975. *Philosophische Untersuchungen*. Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp.

Woolf, Virginia. 1996. *Mrs Dalloway*. London: Penguin Books.